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Animal Scents  i 
Abstract 
This book is a guide for tracking an animal in a text or in a jungle.  It offers a non -dichotomous, non-
totalizing, primordially ethical relation of self to animal.  A relation where the self is not radically detached, 
disinterested and alienated from a marginalized and valueless animal other. Out of this work emerges 
alternative ‘conceptions’ of animal alterity.  Conceptions where the self is fully imbedded in and has 
responsibility to the other, yet does not (only) appropriate its alterity into conception.  Here I explore the 
structure, economy and dynamics of species differentiation between the human and the animal, within the 
realm of knowledge, and beyond, with the goal of capturing the animal otherwise—as uncapturable.  The 
animal I am tracking recedes like the horizon upon approach, yet it could not be more intimately close to 
me.  To help us track the trace and scent of our messianic quarry I draw on the works of Merleau-Ponty, 
Levinas, and Derrida.  
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Stuhlmann, traveling in the Semliki valley [Congo] in 1891, saw a piece of striped skin used in a 
belt and mistook it for that of the zebra… 
 
The actual existence of the okapi was only made known  to science  as late as 1900 by Sir Harry H. 
Johnston...  
 
[In 1915 a] calf okapi only a few days old was brought into Bambili…The little animal was 
eventually brought to Europe, and arrived at the Zoological Gardens at Antwerp in August 1919.  
Unfortunately soon after its arrival it sickened and died… 
 
In 1913 I had the good fortune to shoot a young male in the Ituri forest near Mawambi after an 
ardous  two days’ hunt, in which the animal was tracked for me  by two of my little Bambute friends...   
 
While in the forest near our camp he [Hedemark] suddenly came upon the fresh tracks of an okapi, 
and a hundred yards further saw the animal quite unconscious of the danger, feeding with its head 
amongst some leafy boughs.  It was an easy matter to shoot it…  
 
He [Reid] heard some large animal break away.  After following it up, he fired at what he thought, in 
the half-light, was a buffalo, but which proved to be a fine old male okapi… 
 
During the eighteen months I spent in the Ituri-Aruwimi forest I saw the living okapi on several 
occasions.  Generally I only caught a glimpse, sometimes at very close quarters.  Probably no 
animal is so shy, or so ghost-like in its movements through the forest. It is, I should think , the most 
difficult of all beasts to catch even a sight of in its dim and far-off solitudes.  For the European to 
have any chance of success he must first secure  the confidence of the little men to whom the forest 
belongs.  This being accomplished—and it is far from easy—weeks of hard work searching and 
tracking have to be endured, often on hands and knees, with a heavy gun, sometimes in waist-
deep swamps, for the forest is not all uniform in character.  Months have been spent in practicing 
forest craft with little trackers, and in learning to interpret the meaning of every noise, of every stick-
crack, for the hunter, like the animals, is almost wholly dependent upon his ears... 
 
On two occasions I had one in front of me at a distance of thirty yards or less in the dark  forest.  I 
could see nothing but the white on the face and legs, which I did not recognize as part of anything 
living, till the animal bolted and I wasted my shot… 
 
My little companion, with his  nose to the ground searching and feeling for footprints… with me 
close behind him…Without looking round, he pointed intently with his bent forefinger…. I looked 
and looked…. I could see nothing save a patch of light which I took  to be a ray of sunshine...1 
      
Christy, Big Game and Pygmies , 1924.          
 
           
 
 There is an animal loose in this text.  I want to capture this animal.  But should/can/must animals 
be captured?  To capture something, in a paper or in a forest, not that these can be separated, nor 
amalgamated, it must first be made into a thing.  To capture this thing one must decide where ‘they’ end 
and the ‘animal’ begins.  But what are animals?  Perhaps the question of ‘what’ is the wrong one to ask, it 
seems to dictate a response of knowing.  Should the response be ethical rather than ontological?  Can 
the realm of knowledge be separated from that of ethics?  Can knowledge capture animals, which is to 
ask: can one experience an animal in thought?  Is it even possible to not think of animals?  That is, if 
there are problems with, or limits to, the posture of knowing animals can one simply do away with the 
thought of animals?  Are there alternatives to the relation of thinking of animals?  The thought of animals 
constantly presents itself, even, or especially when one is attempting to know oneself as human.  The 
posture of knowing, most notably, knowing oneself, supposedly a human self, has always been 
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preoccupied with knowing the animal realm, qua understanding.  In this way the configuration of humanity 
presupposes animality.  Thus any change in the understanding of animals involves a change in the 
human.  Knowing the animal clearly, with the light of reason, allows us to see where in fact the boundary 
between the so-called animal and the so-called human can be established.  But animals always seem to 
break out of the fences they are put in.  Fences always need to be maintained, for if it is not the 
‘domesticated’ animal breaking out, it is the ‘wild’ animal breaking in.  A fence marks the limit of one’s 
property—what is supposedly proper to the human.  Humans are what act properly.  Animals, on the 
other hand, are unruly.  The fence between species establishes a realm of propriety for the human self.  
But as it turns out, animality is not so easily tamed.  From where do these species differences (fences) 
arise?  I would like to explore the ‘structure’, economy and dynamics of species differentiation, most 
notably, that between the human and the animal, within the realm of knowledge, and beyond, if such a 
thing is possible.  This is in the hopes of reconfiguring the primacy of responsibility over capturing.  But 
we will always be too late to capture this primacy of responsibility.  Yet this is precisely the paradoxical 
goal of revealing the animal otherwise.  
This discussion can be seen as a guide to tracking animals.  It is a re-conception and exploration 
of the animal beyond conception.  I want to challenge and situate the human–animal relation as it 
congeals in understanding, phenomena, ontology, and representation.  A keen tracker will already have 
caught the scent of the animal disturbing and supporting understanding.  This keen tracker will have 
noted the breaches in the fence where the animal has been slipping through all along.  As I have just 
claimed, one reason to put up a fence is to establish what is your property—what is properly human.  This 
is already a recognition of the animal—what is to be kept out.  This tie between propriety and 
understanding is a key tip in this tracking guide.  These breaches in the fence and improprieties reveal 
the movements and perennial migration patterns of animals along little known but well worn paths.  I think 
we can learn much from the movement patterns of animals around and through fences.  But learning itself 
may prove to be quite a hindrance.  Is it not learning that wishes to fortify, multiply and expand the fence? 
Is learning not an attempt to master the unknown?  Let us turn to the gaps in the fence where there are 
disturbances in understanding and learning so that we join in on the chase, with no hope of catching or 
fencing in the animal.  At least there is no hope of seeing the animal in the shadowless light of high noon2.  
The animals that I’m after, the ones that we can learn the most from, learn the most about learning, are 
those which are the most elusive.  The animals that live in the shadows, like the okapi.  These are the 
animals that are not known or seen clearly.  However, we may catch their scent. The trouble with tracking 
an animal whose appearance, or lack there of, will be in the form of a trace, is that if you finally think you 
have captured it, you will lose its inspiring scent, or the scent inspired.  The animal I’m tracking recedes 
like the horizon upon approach.  The trace of the animal is so elusive that it cannot even be captured by 
the concept of trace.  But we have to capture the animal if it is to figure in new ways in its relation to 
humans.  Should we not just do away with the project of capturing, and all the violence that entails, 
altogether?  This assumes that we can do away with capturing?  I do not think we can or should.  The 
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animal is always already captured as soon as the human, the ‘I’, the fork, the thought, and the pen arrive.  
(In both senses of the word pen: (a) the writing implement, and (b) the tight fenced enclosure for animals.  
And the fact of this equivocation is anything but parenthetical or coincidental.  It is the central theme of 
this paper.  Why is it no coincidence that the central theme should make an appearance within 
parenthesis, that which is to be tangential?  The animal will always be marginal, outside of the major 
themes, the farmhouse, reason, and the city.  You may have noticed that the explorers searching for the 
okapi were never able to see it face-on.  The animal I am tracking will be on the horizon.  This is an 
important tip for those wanting to track animals, especially the animal loose in this paper: always note the 
irreducible ambiguity of writing’s structure and that of animal’s habitat—let us call it the ambiguity of the 
pen).  To assume that it is possible to make a clean break from capturing animals only serves to mystify 
its violence.  I feel that we have an obligation to capture animals otherwise.  I want to capture animals as 
uncapturable. This is what I feel an environmentalism that truly respected difference would entail.   
Why do I want to capture the animal differently?  As we saw in the quote that opened this paper, 
the style used to track and capture the elusive okapi, a style that is perhaps the most dominant in western 
thought, often resulted in their death.  Death is one way to capture an animal.  Perhaps it is the best way 
to master it and subdue its feral ways.  Killing animals often proves very useful for science to understand 
animals.  Killing is the ultimate way to objectify.  But this dominant style does not always result in the 
death of the animal.  It could be argued that we can better understand animals alive.  But what will soon 
become clear is that, dead or alive, understanding animals will always involve capture.  However, even 
within this text/jungle, quoted above, that exemplifies the dominant posture of knowing/capturing animals, 
there is another human-animal relation.  There was an elusive okapi of which the scientist only got a 
glimpse. It had a ‘ghost-like’ presence, he claimed.  It was present as a positive absence, or trace.  This 
animal was precisely what slipped away from the European scientist’s direct gaze.  This scientist, who 
ventured to the frontier of the ‘dark’ continent, was traumatized by the inconsistency of the jungle.  The 
animal trace was mistaken for a ray of light.  It was beyond the clarity of the light.  It is this uncapturable 
animal, present as a trace, that I want to capture.     
To help us with our messianic quarry, a quarry that will always have yet to arrive, I will draw on 
some of the work of Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, and Derrida.  I will draw on their works in a way that leaves 
tensions between them.  Tensions are unresolved.  If they were to be resolved they would close up on the 
animal and capture it in understanding.  The animal we are after is beyond understanding.  These 
tensions will provide the openings for the animal to come into understanding as a trace.  This is how we 
will understand the animal otherwise (than understanding).  It is in these openings that we will catch the 
animals scent.  I will track this scent through the following general tensions.  Broadly, I see Merleau-Ponty 
pulling the tension in the direction of composition.  By composition I mean that he composes or tames the 
animal relation in an orderly fashion.  He tames the animal enough to get a good glimpse of it.  Perhaps 
he gets too good of a glimpse at it, for remember the animal is what is refractory to the gaze.  This being 
said, we still must always take a good look at the animal if only to realize that it is beyond that look.  
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Pulling the tension in another direction will be Levinas’ theories.  In his theories will be the potential to 
decompose the human-animal relation.  He will perhaps offer an animal that will traumatize and rupture 
any orderly understanding of the animal.  This animal will be encountered beyond understanding in an 
ethical relation.  Put generally, Derrida will put tension on both these authors.  He will show both the 
necessity and impossibility of both composing and decomposing the animal.  In this way he will push and 
pull Merleau-Ponty and Levinas at the same time, towards and away from their positions of composition 
and decomposition.  One way he will do this is with his deconstruction of the text-animal dichotomy.  
However, the other two writers will pull back against Derrida.  In a paradoxical way, this tug-of-war 
between all three of them will serve to form their alliance.  They will compliment each other via their 
opposition.  Out of this (dis)equilibrium will form the opening where we will catch a whiff of the animal.  
 But before I take a more detailed look at their respective works I will first provide a sketch, a 
composition, of the human-animal relation and how I envision we go about tracking the animal through 
the terrain of this composition.  This will involve a generalized appeal to Merleau -Ponty, Levinas and 
Derrida to help us catch the scent of the animal disrupting this arrangement.  The animal’s rustling will 
disturb this composition enough to form a crack where we will catch a glimpse of it. 
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The Vision (of Scent and the Scent of Vision) 
 
 
 
“The okapi was one of the last animals to be discovered by modern man.  In fact, for a 
long time, it was sort of a ‘mysterious animal.’  No one really knew what it was.”3 
   
      Schlein, On the Track of the Mysterious Animal. 
 
 
My Vision 
 
  A new story of the human-animal has to be told.  The dominant western story of what is called 
‘the animal’ allows for the horrors of its sacrifice to be invisible.  But, is not the process of turning the 
animal into a story, bringing it into the light of reason, annexing it into the realm of knowledge, the 
problem to begin with?  The gesture of knowing and representing the animal is an appropriating move.  
This move removes the alterity of the animal other in appropriating it into the human realm of the knowing 
human self.  This appropriation happens in spite of, or better, precisely because of the exile of the so-
called non-human into the realm of the animal.  Further, this appropriation will still take place in my 
articulation.  It will be argued here that it is a creature’s irreducible absolute otherness that allows for an 
ethical relation with it.  It is in this otherness that one becomes responsible to the creature.  However, it is 
this otherness that cannot be captured, ‘conceptually’ or ‘physically’ (not that these can be separated), by 
any delimitation of the human from the animal.  It will be argued that the ethical relation with a particular 
creature is more primary, and precedes/exceeds any relationship of knowing.  This otherness cannot be 
appropriated into a story, knowledge, or a representation.  In fact, it is precisely what is refractory to 
knowledge.  
But we are still left with the problem of having to tell a new story.  Is it not this un-representable 
otherness, which, it will be argued, is the ‘source’ and realm of responsibility to animals, that which we 
want to, or better, have to represent?  We must make the ethical obligations to animals visible.  We must 
meet our obligation.  Yet, as has been just mentioned, it is knowing, visibility, and representation that 
foreclose the ethical relation.  The otherness of the animal must remain other.  For as soon as it is known 
the other is reduced to a concept, a theme, a representation, and so on.  Even if this representation 
challenges the dominant western themes of animal as object, resource, meal, spectacle, etc. the 
reduction will still take place.  An animal is not a representation, it is other than that.  We are left with a 
double bind or what I will call an aporia.  We must represent the animal as other, but in doing so we 
consume it into sameness.  But notice what strangely happens when one hits this double bind; the 
otherness makes a fleeting appearance, or at least a quasi-appearance.  That is, when one tries to 
represent the unrepresentable, qua unrepresentiblilty, which we must, the absolute otherness presents 
itself.  Or better, it presents itself as an absence.  When this aporia is lived through, which is the going 
through of an impasse, the experience of the impossible, the other becomes present as an absence, or 
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the absence of a presence.  The other is given as a trace.  By trace here I mean a positive absence, or 
absence of full presence.  This trace is a betrayal.  First, it is a betrayal of the otherness, because one is 
appropriating it.  That is, one is betraying it in terms of not doing it justice by letting it remain other.  But it 
is also a betrayal in the sense of a revealing, as in when a rustling bush betrays an animals whereabouts 
(an occurrence well documented by those tracking the okapi).  Or better, when a quarry’s scent divulges it 
trail.  Key to the betrayal of the animal is meeting one’s obligation to it, as Caputo says: “To take on an 
obligation is to make oneself out as being in the wrong, to concede that the being-for -oneself of the I 
spells trouble for the other”4.  
 If the animal is represented as the unrepres entable, as a double bind, it reveals itself as a trace.  
The tension of the aporia, however, must always be maintained; the impossibility of the venture, which 
one is setting out to accomplish, the making visible of that which will remain invisible, must always be kept 
in the foreground.  If there is a relaxation of the tension between having to represent, but not being able to 
represent, there will be a breach of the impasse, and the animal will not be represented as that which is 
beyond.  If the tension is relaxed, and there is a breach in the aporia, one will think they have arrived at 
the other, in full presence, not as a trace.   
So here in my representation of the so-called animal, and the human-animal relation, I too must 
maintain the tension.  I must show the absolute necessity of showing our responsibility to other creatures 
while all the while describing the futility of my venture.  That is, my responsibility to an animal entails that I 
must tell a new story of the animal. I must do this, however, while realizing that this story identifies what is 
beyond identity.  I want to show how structurally the I, identity, human, knowledge, and so on, always 
already poses a threat to the other.  This is the only way that that the animal will be revealed as a trace. 
There is also something else strange going on in my analysis.  I will describe the strange 
relationship between the representation and the represented as one where these two cannot be divided 
nor combined.  If a strict separation between a representation and the represented cannot be maintained, 
which will soon become evident, then my representation of the animal as trace cannot be strictly 
separated from the animal itself.  Just as the dominant western conception of the animal, as an object or 
a resource, comes to inflect and imbue the real and the phenomena, so too will my tropes, metaphors, 
symbolism and figures inflect the real.  The animal as trace is no mere metaphor.  Or better, when the 
relation between the metaphor and the real is complicated, when one is no longer able to separate them 
by a single limit, when one cannot tell (know, or see) where one ends and the other begins, when they 
are not seen as being in opposition, the metaphor becomes the real, and vice versa.  As I opened up this 
paper by saying ‘there is an animal loose in this text’, I meant it literally.  For once again, as will soon be 
shown, one is no longer able to delimit the literal from the metaphorical.  This does not mean that the 
literal and the metaphorical can be collaps ed into some third term.  Quite to the contrary, it is their 
resistance to being collapsed which also makes them resists being fully separated.  They have a peculiar 
relation so that there will always be realness to the metaphor, and a metaphor for the real.  The real 
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needs the metaphor, and vice versa.  Thus, I mean that there is literally, with a realness of the highest 
order, an animal in this text.     
Further, the animal loose in this paper, the animal trace, is exactly that animal which is loose and 
causing such havoc in such binaries as symbolic-literal and metaphor-real. Remember the animal is an 
absolute other, that which is the very thing, or non-thing, that is refractory to reason, knowledge, the 
concept, a theme, visibility, thingification, and so on.  Here, drawing on Levinas, I would like to make a 
dangerous, if not impossible distinction between absolute otherness and the otherness in the realm of 
knowledge, reason, ontology, phenomena, and so forth.  The former is what exceeds and founds this 
latter realm.  The absolute other founds the realm of ontology by infusing it with difference.  It is the 
‘medium’ in which such dichotomies as self and other can form.  Further, absolute otherness is that which 
cannot be captured by such dichotomies as self-other.  It disturbs and multiplies them.  For my ‘authentic’ 
account of the animal I want to capture its absolute otherness.  This absolute otherness is, let us 
tentatively say, ‘the real’ otherness of a creature, as opposed to the otherness that is captured in 
knowledge by such oppositions as self-other.  I hope to capture an animal as the other of what is 
captured.  It is the other of reason, which would hope to capture it with these binaries.  However, the 
animal is what precedes them.  Reason will only catch the trace of the animal other (or animal as other, or 
other as animal).  Reason only catches the animal’s scent.  If reason were to catch the animal, in itself, in 
full presence, it would not be other but would be the same; it would no longer be an animal, but human.   
Reason presupposes this animal other.  This other is what allows for the peculiar dynamic and 
economy between the binaries.  If not for the irreducible uncircumscribility of alterity there would not be 
the strange opening or distance between such binaries as the symbolic-literal, animal-human, self-other, 
subject-object, man-woman, and so on.  Alterity infuses the self with the difference necessary for reason.  
In this way reason is reflection.  Reflection needs distance.  Distance requires difference.  In this schema 
reflection is self-reflection.  It is self-coincidence.  Consciousness is self-consciousness.  The self can 
only re-cognize itself.  What is seen as truth is what is known, not what is unknown.  The unknown is that 
which does not make sense.  It is what is untrue.  Here, the absolute other is not reducible to either the 
subject or object, or self and other.  It is the condition of possibility for these oppositions to arise.  Reason 
is resemblance, and resemblance needs irreducible difference.  Reason needs otherness.  Reason needs 
the animal.  Humanity needs its other, that which supposedly has no reason, the animal.  In this way, 
humanity is reason.  The dominant conception of animals in western thought has always been one of 
privation.  Animality is always the lack of a human quality.  Yet, in spite of, or because of this, non-
essence, of animals, they become essential to the forming of the essence of the human subject.  The 
Animal sustains the limits on which humanity rests.  Animality provides the opening for the human self to 
define itself within.  It can only do so because of the absence that animality imports into imminence, and 
presence.  Presence presupposes, thus follows, the positive absence of the animal.   
In this schema the animal becomes the origin or source, of humanity, truth, presence, etc.  
However, this origin or source has to be understood in terms other than that of the realm of the human 
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self and its knowledge.  Origins and sources understood within knowledge, which is the only way to 
understand them, are capturable in full presence, thus remaining immanent within the human sphere.  We 
are after the animal that transcends the human and what is captured.  This source or origin is beyond, as 
such.  It is beyond the dichotomies that would want to get a hold of it, such as inside-outside, immanent-
transcendent, self-other, and so on.  Reason, with its dichotomies, always arrives late to the source.  With 
the arrival of reason the absolute other is appropriated into the economy of self-reflection.  Here the other 
is serving as the mere other to reflect the self.  The arrival of the I, consciousness, knowing, and the 
personal self spells trouble for the absolute other.  The absolute other has always just fled the scene.  
The animal I am after is extremely elusive, like the okapi.  This can be illustrated through my experiences 
of growing up in the foothills of the Canadian Rockies where I several times caught a glimpse, and only a 
glimpse of a fleeing wolverine.  Or better, I caught a glimpse of the fleeing, more than the wolverine 
fleeing, but never enough to identify it with certainty.  Identity too, arrives late to the animal I am after.  
Identity requires the certainty and clarity of understanding which is sameness, not the unknown.  We are 
after animal otherness, not how animals have served in human configuration.  The animal as source or 
origin, both understood otherwise than understanding, is an absolute horizon that will always be out of 
reach for the self.  The animal I’m after, like the wolverine and the okapi, is always fleeting, and I am 
always after it, be it at the edge of a mountain meadow or in a paradoxical turn of phrase in an essay, not 
that it is even possible to determine the difference between these two, nor unify them.5   
Yet, as I see it,  the ‘self’ does have a primordial contact with this source.  However, this contact 
happens before the self arrives, so it cannot really be said that it happens to the self.  The arrival of the 
self presupposes this primitive contact with the absolute other in so far as it is the medium and condition 
of possibility for the opposition of self and other to emerge.  But again, as with ‘source’ and ‘origin’, one 
must be very careful not to understand this primordialness in terms of knowledge.  It is before knowledge.  
The very process of knowing this primitive contact, like my attempt here, is a movement away from it. The 
contact happens before one tries to know it.  But this ‘before’, and temporality in general, is already 
understood in terms of knowledge.  Thus the primordial contact is before this before.  In this primordial 
contact with the absolute otherness of the animal, the animal’s otherness has a priority over the human.  
The human, with its opposition of human and animal, comes late to the animal’s otherness.  The human 
self, and the human -animal dichotomy, presupposes this contact with the animal other.  The human-
animal dichotomy, and knowledge in general, can be seen as a response to this primordial cont act.  
Otherness here, infuses the self from before the beginning.  The self is otherness in its very origin.  
Paradoxically the beyond is what is closest.   
Here, metaphor in general can be tentatively located in the realm of knowledge, logos, 
representation, and so on.  Thus metaphor too arrives late to its source.  Metaphors, like reason, attempt 
to capture this ‘primitive contact’.  There will always be a lagging behind of the metaphor.  It will only 
catch the scent of the animal that is its source.  But  notice my metaphor for the metaphor--it is animality.   
In this paper, in my representation, animality is a metaphor for the relationship of metaphors to animals.  
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Like metaphors I am trying to catch the uncatchable.  What is important is not only the futi lity of my task, 
but the fact that I too must appeal to the animal.  If my goal in this paper is to re -present the animal, as it 
is, I must have contact with it.  I must transcend myself and make contact with the other.  This primordial 
contact with the other must infuse the self.  At the very limit of the self, at the point of contact, at the limit 
of metaphor, the threshold of the self must always draw on the animal.  What soon becomes (un)clear is 
that it is impossible to strictly separate or collapse the metaphorical from the literal.  The metaphorical 
presupposes the literal and the literal requires the metaphorical to manifest in representations.  Here my 
metaphor for the animal, and the human animal relation, is the animal—which is not (only) a metaphor at 
all.  The animal must always be understood literally and metaphorically, yet neither just literally nor 
metaphorically.  Consequently, given that my metaphor for metaphor is the animal, that that is not (only) a 
metaphor, we must take it literally—there is an animal loose in this text. 
The precise moment when the metaphorical and the literal (or any of the other dichotomies) are 
the most equivocal is the moment of contact.  That is when my text makes contact with the animal.  That 
is when animality is revealed (betrayed).  That is when there is communication between the human and 
the animal.  This communication will be received, form the perspective of the human subject, as a 
disturbance.  Otherness, what is unknown, what is contradictory, what has yet to be made clear, is 
unsettling.  It unsettles what is settled in the self and its sameness.  However, this disturbance does not 
come from afar, it comes from within the subject, for as we have seen the self’s contact with otherness is 
its very origin, but an origin that cuts across any opposition of inside and outside.  This disturbance 
sustains the subject.   
This disruption will be seen as a violence towards the self. But perhaps a good violence to those 
of us who see the identity of the human and the animal, and all the boundaries that this entails, as 
problematic.  That is, it could be argued that the dominant western conceptions of the human-animal 
relation is increasingly preoccupied and dominated by a relation of knowing.  Perhaps some of the factors 
contributing to this preoccupation with and valorization of knowledge, to name but a few for the purpose 
of example, were the enlightenment period and the scientific revolution.  The problem with seeing the 
relation of knowing as the problem is that I do not think it is possible to avoid it, or at least I do not think it 
is possible to identify its increase with a particular epoch.  One problem I see with the identification of 
particular epochs with particular problematic postures is the dependence of this type of historical analysis 
on the dichotomization of the particular from the general.  I see all ‘problematic’ postures as always both 
particular and general.  How are we then to account for the undeniable increase in the unprecedented 
slaughter of animals over the past few centuries?  Perhaps the problem is not so much with the relation of 
knowing but with an increase in the closing off of the known.  When the known gets so heavily valorized it 
seems to get reified, cut off and decontextualized away from its dependence on and subordination to the 
other.  But it seems to be in the  ‘nature’ of the known to cut itself off, so I am not sure this is something 
that can be avoided definitively or correlated with a particular epoch either.  Perhaps then the cause for 
this unprecedented slaughter is an increase in the extent of the homogeneity of knowledge.  Knowledge 
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can be seen as forming bigger and bigger monoliths with an ever-increasing imperialistic ferocity.  With 
an increase in homogeneity of the known comes a decrease in otherness.  However, I have some 
apprehensions with identifying the ‘problematic posture’ of humans to animals in this way.  It becomes 
hard to tell if this homogenous monolith can be identified with an epoch, or is a consequence of the 
homogenizing effects of my reasoning in my own historical analysis.  That is, I imagine that many of the 
historical generalizations I am making in this paper themselves wipe out many heterogeneous 
knowledges within these time periods and regions.  Heterogeneities that were and could continue to 
serve as resistances to sameness.  Thus the fruitfulness of this approach becomes limited.  But not 
entirely.  One cannot simply do away with the general and work only with the specific.  This only 
reinforces the dichotomy of these concepts: ‘general’ and ‘specific’.  One still offers a generality even in 
the form of anti-generality, for instance, when one says: ‘there is only the specific’.  As has been said 
above, the ‘problematic posture’ of knowing is both specific and general and neither only one of these, or 
reducible to some third term.  What is key is that the brutality of the appropriation of reason, the human, 
knowledge, the self, and so on, is not something that is to be done away with definitively, nor something 
inevitable.  This brutality cannot be captured by this opposition.  In fact this opposition, like all the other 
oppositions of reason are exactly those that capitulate this brutality.  It is these oppositions, like that of the 
human and animal, that must be disturbed by the ‘good violence’ of absolute otherness.  
This disruption will disturb the self with its reliance on the known—the tame.  The self, with its 
attempt to establish boundaries will be traumatized by contact with the animal.  Animality is what is 
supposedly wild.  The human attempts to cast the wild outside of itself, to quarantine wildness in such 
concepts as ‘animal’, or in such regions as ‘parks’ (again, not that a concept can be separated from a 
region).  To aid in this quarantine are all the fences and boundaries that have already been mentioned.  
But the absolute otherness of the animal exceeds, disrupts, overwhelms and multiplies these boundaries.  
It is a wildness that cannot be tamed.  It is what is alien to the limits imposed on it.  It rebels, complicates, 
bucks, equivocates, blocks, multiplies, the establishment of a pure subject.  To think that the wild can be 
cast out of the human and isolated in an oppositional category called ‘the animal’ only mystifies the 
wildness ‘within’ ‘us’.  Animality is always already at work in humanity, and by giving voice to it we will 
literally hear the animal.    
Lippit offers a good summary of the ways in which ‘the human’ can communicate with ‘the animal’ 
via alterity.  He highlights how “the animal becomes intertwined with the trope, serving as its vehicle and 
substance”6: 
The question of language, which is inextricably linked to human and animal beings, is 
necessarily implicated in the encounter with animality and the figure of the animal.  If the 
animal is said to lack language, to represent the site of radical alterity, then words cannot 
circumscribe the being of animals as animals.  The contact between language and the 
animal marks a limit of figurability, a limit of the very function of language.7 
 
This ‘lack of language’ here ironically serves as the means of possible communication between the 
human and the animal.  It is at the limit of language that this contact or encounter will take place.  I, 
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however, drawing on Levinas’ work, that we will turn to below, would challenge, or perhaps extend Lippit 
when he says that “words cannot circumscribe the being of animals” (my emphasis).  I would suggest that 
the absolute alterity of animals is beyond being.  I would place being within the realm of language.  But 
more will be said about that when we turn to Levinas.  Lippit continues: 
The intervention of the animal figure raises questions about the origin of the metaphor, its 
place in the world of language.  One might posit provisionally that the animal functions 
not only as an exemplar metaphor but, within the scope of rhetorical language, as an 
originary metaphor.  One finds a fantastic transversality at work between the animal and 
the metaphor—the animal is already a metaphor, the metaphor an animal.  Together they 
transport to language, breath into language [inspire], the vitality of another life, another 
expression: animal and metaphor, a metaphor made flesh, a living metaphor that is by 
definition not a metaphor, antimetaphor, “animetaphor.”  …The animal brings to language 
something that is not part of language and remains within language as a foreign 
presence.  8 
 
One might conclude from this, that when Lippit suggests that animality is the metaphor of metaphor, he 
places animality in opposition to language.  However, I am using this passage to conclude, again, 
perhaps pressing or extending Lippit’s comments here, that, again paradoxically, that the relation of 
metaphor and language to animality is not oppositional.  Or better, the paradox of their apparent 
opposition is that they are not opposed.  Through the metaphor, metaphorized as animal, the animal 
becomes essential to metaphor and language.  It is precisely the animal’s “foreign presence” that is the 
necessary alterity that serves as the ‘source’ for language.   
 
Vision 
 
There is only one place in the world that the okapi lives: deep in the tropical rain forest of central 
Africa.  To anyone not accustom to the rain forest, it is a mysterious and dangerous place…. The 
trees are gigantic.  Their uppermost leaves meet 100 feet up, blocking out the sunlight….  They did 
not know what this animal was.  And it was so shy, and ran away so quickly, they could never get a 
good look at it.  One explorer might just get just a glimpse of some stripes, and he would say he 
saw some kind of zebra.9   
 
    Schlein, On the Track of the Mysterious Animal. 
 
 
Thus far I have introduced some strategies for tracking animal’s trace with/in language, 
knowledge and reason.  I will now turn our focus to the animal’s trail picked up in vision.  However, this is 
not to suggest that vision, and the other senses, can be fully separated from reason (which would be part 
of the very traditional separation of the intellectual from the bodily, perhaps best exemplified by Descartes 
mind/body split).  On the contrary, tracking of the animal’s movement as it disturbs this dichotomy will be 
one of the most important and prolific habitats to catch a glimpse of animals in this paper. 
In order to schematize the human-animal relation, which is impossible, I would now like to 
consider the animals ‘surface’ as a reflective mirror.  As has been argued above, I am tentatively 
considering all human representations and understanding as mere reflections of the human realm.  Thus, 
it is not a matter of getting to a representation or understanding that is beyond the reflection.  Ironically, it 
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is only through the acknowledgement that all understanding is reflection that an encounter with the 
beyond will occur.  If we are to get beyond the current understandings, beyond our own reflection, and 
have a ‘genuine’ account of another creature then we must track the disturbances, paradoxes, tensions, 
ironies, and contradictions that are hidden in the mirror image.  We must track the trace, the animal as 
trace.  It could be argued that a flat mirror juxtaposing the spectating subject would be the scientific ideal.  
And it is exactly this conception of the animal, and the human animal relation that I want to disturb.  
However, it must be remembered that this articulation of science and its ideal are representations 
themselves.  Consequently, they too, have already undergone the violent appropriation of all 
understanding and representation.  These representations mask and annex heterogeneities in scientific 
practices and ideals.  That is why they must be considered only as tentative.  This ideal of self-
coincidence in reflection already presupposes its own inappropriateness.  Gasche explains: 
The alterity that splits reflection from itself and thus makes it able to fold itself into itself – 
to reflect itself – is also what makes it, for structural reasons, incapable of closing upon 
itself.  The very possibility of reflexivity is also the subversion of its own source….It opens 
itself up to the thought of alterity, a difference that remains unaccounted for by the polar 
opposites of source and reflection, principle and what is derived from it, the one and the 
Other. 10 
 
 If one looks attentively at the reflection, there will always be cracks.  And sometime, when 
looking at a crack, out of the corner of your eye (a trace can never be seen directly, only obliquely), one 
will catch sight (if it can even be called sight, perhaps it is the unseen in the seen) of the tain in the mirror.  
This tain is the absolute other.  This is the other creature that supports the reflection.  This other is more 
primary than the reflection.  It is the source of the reflection.  It is here at this contact with the tain, the tain 
within the subject and its reflection, that there is hope for a genuine encounter with the absolute other.  
Here the other can imbue the self with its inexhaustible plenitude.  It is in this encounter that there is hope 
in understanding the ethical obligations to this animal other.      
When one is attentive to a crack at the limit of reflection the mirror metaphor begins to break (for 
instance, it becomes hard to separate the crack from the tain).  The crack is more like a tectonic fissure 
spewing forth lava—a dehiscence of the other from within the subject.  However this ‘within’ cannot be 
captured by the dichotomy of inside-outside, and should not be understood as an idealism, or the like (in 
fact, this dehiscence is what breaks through the idealism of a self-reflecting subject imminent in 
sameness).  Within this geothermal framework reflection still has its place11.  As the lava begins to cool a 
thin semi-reflective skin can begin to form on its surface.  Eventually the fissure, as it cools, produces 
massive rigid plates, but at the source it is as though one can see the magma.  Though of course, all one 
can see is lava at the surface.  Magma will always be beyond, but lava presupposes magma.  In the lava 
one will find its trace.  One can almost follow its currents from the cracks in the lava.  We have reached 
the limits of phenomenology at the threshold of the fissure.  In this schema the lava figures as what is 
known.  It also figures as the phenomena.  Thus, I am limiting phenomenology to the known.  However, 
the absolute other, the unknown, enters into experience through this dehiscence, as a trace.  This is the 
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possibility of experiencing the impossible human-animal relation.  It is only when this relation is 
understood that phenomenology and the known are dichotomized from the absolute other. 
 
Scent 
 
No matter what he [sic] is doing, or where he is, the okapi must always stay alert, because he has 
many enemies, lying in wait.  He knows his enemies.  They are snakes, and leopards, and 
sometimes man.  It is mostly his ears and his nose that warn him of danger, rather than his eyes—
for in the rain forest, things are hidden.  He has keen hearing and a good sense of smell.  At any 
slight sign of danger—an odor or rustling in the vegetation—he will run, dashing deeper into the 
rain forest along the okapi path….  How do they find each other as they wander alone through the 
tangled forest?  As the female walks through the forest, she leaves a trail of strong scent that 
comes from glands in her feet.  The male will not see her at first.  But he will follow this smell-trail.12 
 
        Schlein, On the Track of the Mysterious Animal.   
 
Nietzsche, one of the truly great philosophers of the flesh, the first philosopher to philosophize with 
his nose, whose genius is in his nostrils, is one of the few philosophers to have a nose for the smell 
of the other and to have organized his thought around the order of rank. 13 
Caputo, Against Ethics.  
 
As this quote suggests, Nietzsche’s nose led him to the other.  Although I’m not directly drawing 
on Nietzche, he had a tremendous influence on Merleau-Ponty, Derrida and Levinas.  This is one of the 
reasons I am recruiting their nostrils on our hunt for animals.  
 Perhaps the resistance of the animal to being captured by reason is better captured by an 
olfactory trope than a visual one, such as the tain or magma tropes just explored.  In the western tradition 
vision has been the dominant metaphor for truth.  In Plato’s cave allegory it is the sun that is the origin of 
knowledge and not the derivative shadows in the cave.  The en lightenment placed the subject and object 
under its light of reason.  For Descartes, God is the origin of natural light, which has an exact likeness to 
the human mind’s light of reason.  As Vasseleu, drawing on Derrida, points out that “for Descartes, while 
the existence of God is put into doubt, natural light is never subjected to radical doubt but rather is the 
medium in which doubt unfolds.”14  This indubitable doubt remains hidden in reason’s blind spot.  
Descartes’ clear and distinct criteria for certain and truth propelled western thought into the posture of 
valuing only thought.  A true thought is one known clearly.  An object known with certainty is one seen in 
the brightest light possible.  In critiquing this visual model for the relation between humans and nature, I 
am not suggesting that we do away with clarity, vision, reason and knowing.  On the contrary, I do not 
even think that is possible.  In fact, in some ways this is not even a critique.  ‘Critique’ is already 
understood in terms of lightness and darkness and the visible and the invisible.  These are the 
dichotomies that I am attempting to problematize and contextualize.  For instance, critique is often a 
matter of illuminating contradictions that are what refract clarity and light.  My goal here is to show the 
limits of knowledge and vision, and show their subordination to and dependence on animality.  I want to 
demonstrate that there is more than what is known clearly by the so-called human and I want to make this 
as clear as possible.   
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One way to situate clarity and the dynamics that make a concept possible is to shift to an 
olfactory trope.  Animals have always been conceived as having a superior sense of smell to that of 
humans.  Already scent places a limit on heliocentrism.  Humans are almost oblivious to the complex 
world of animal odors.  The shift to the sense of smell further reinforces the ungraspable realm of the 
animal to language.  Hearne highlights this in the following: “We can draw pictures of scents, but we don’t 
have a language for doing it the other way about, don’t have so much as a counter for representation of 
something visible by means of (actual) scent.”15  What is noteworthy here is not that the visibly is richer 
than odor (which can be concluded from this passage) but that the olfactory is refractory, if you will, to 
(visible) representation.  It offers just the intranslatability into representation that can(not) capture the 
animal’s alterity.  
The world of scents, one can only speculate, is anything but objectifable.  To even call it a world 
is to go against the positive absences of the trace.  Hearne explains that our understanding of scent “is a 
metonymy for knowledge usually, the way the notion of a Bloodhound’s nose is used in detective fiction to 
refer to intuition.  What we have is a sense of smell—for Thanksgiving dinner and skunks and a number 
of things we call chemicals.”16  
What could be more helpful to us on our quest to track the animal than a tracking animal?  Hearn 
explores the radical incompatibility of knowledge to scent by looking at how understanding has tried to 
understand the trace.  She looks at some studies that the U.S. army conducted in trying to defeat the 
enemy’s trained tracking dogs: 
 
In these tests trails were laid through “impossible” terrain… large fields were spray ed with 
gasoline and burned after tracks were laid through them.  Foreign odors, organic and 
inorganic, attractive and repelling, were introduced on top of previously laid tracks.  
Tracklayers were picked up in cars and driven several hundred yards where they 
continued the tracks, or they removed their shoes along the trail, replaced them with a 
sterilized pair, and continued the track.  Tracklayers entered rivers, swam down stream 
under water with snorkels and emerge on the opposite bank to continue the tracks.  None 
of these tactics or devices consistently defeated the trained tracking dogs used in these 
tests.17   
 
What is noteworthy here is scent’s incommensurability with understanding, as such, which is 
shown by the army’s attempts to understand tracking animals.  Tracking appears to operate in a 
manner antithetical to logos.   
 As well, the experience of smelling seems to offer a relationship that is more open to the other.  
In the visual conception of the self and other, as exemplified by the scientific gaze, the subject is a 
removed disembodied spectator viewing the objectified other form a god like perspective, from above, or 
from everywhere.  Smelling is a relation of inspiring, in both senses of the word.  The subject breathes in 
the other into its core.  The other is not seen as an obstacle to be concurred, mastered, known, and 
appropriated.  Rather, when breathing, the other inspires, as in being a source for vitality—a muse.  
When one takes deep breaths one often feels ‘grounded’.  Knowing comes late to the experience of this 
ground.  Here the relation of knowing and smelling can be distinguished, but it cannot fully be separated, 
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yet nor can it be collapsed.  One’s state when breathing has yet to be tapped as a locus for human-
animal communication.    
Moreover, scent, while remaining a metaphor of intertwining embrace of self and other, seems to 
preserve a distance.  The other is beyond its scent.  Yet this is not the distance of the consuming gaze 
that allows for theoretical knowing.  Smell situates the subject within the mutual unfolding of subject and 
object.  Smell challenges the intelligible-sensible dichotomy that more readily can be applied to vision.  
However, my move to scent is not an attempt to reinstitute a hierarchy of the senses with smell now at the 
top.  Rather, I would like to show that the features that characterize the self-other relationship in scent are 
also to be found in vision.  There are times, for politically strategic purposes, to focus on the structures of 
scent, just as there are other times to focus on vision.  I would see my project parallel to Irigaray’s when 
she speaks of the touch of light.18  Here Irigaray, by showing the tactile aspect of vision, situates and 
embodies light.  Thus there are different ways of touching even within the visual.  Both the hand and the 
eye can grasp, hold at a distance, which is really a taking for oneself.  I would posit as an ideal the eye 
that touches with a caress.  Such as that of lovers, where the ideal is a pure gift with no hope for 
exchange (although gift and exchange will always have an ambiguity).19  The visual caress shares an 
openness to the other with the sense of smell. As well, smell’s ephemeral character keeps it open to the 
alterity of the future, smell cannot be sustained as a thought. That is, smell is not graspable in the sense 
that it dissipates, thus leaving an opening for the new—the always future smell.  This absolute future 
aspect of smell is a characteristic of the animal I am after.  One that is always to come.  This is the 
messianic quality of animality.  If it comes it will be made human, tamed, or domesticated.  Paradoxically, 
as Lippit points out, smell also has an exceptional affinity for recollection and the past.  It seems to act as 
a threshold to the unconscious, another other within the self20. 
What is also interesting about my appeal to scent in comparison to vision is that vision stinks.  Let 
us not forget that what we see as vision is a metaphor.  Or at least any theory or phenomena of vision 
can never be separated from metaphor.  And the dominant metaphors for vision stink.  They stink in so 
far as they are not very good.  They miss much of the ways in which vision is like scent, which also makes 
them stink.  All of the characteristics that I have pointed out in scent, such as an openness to the other, 
an intertwining of the subject and object, and so on, can be found in parallel forms in vision.  For instance, 
scent seems to have a material thickness of the medium of communication between humans and 
animals.  This situates the phenomena within the particular context of the interaction.  Vision too has a 
material medium.  However, the dominant western metaphors for vision skip over, are blind to, and 
repress this aspect of vision.  And this is no coincidence.  As I have amply demonstrated, vision and 
reason form alliance whose quest has been to transcend the material realm and its situatedness in the 
hope of the universal.        
Additionally, the sense of smelling reveals animality within the human.  It has always been 
considered a ‘primitive’ sense.  Animals live in the realm of scent.  The animal is a scent.  We are on that 
scent, and will always be following it.  Lippit elaborates the veiled presence of both scents and animals 
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well when he states: “Smells then, like animals, but unlike conventional signs, do not open the world from 
which they have come.  Or rather, scents and animals do open the world they inhabit but open that world 
[to us] as closed, shrouded, as a world that has faded, without ever having been present…”21 My goal 
here is both to represent the animal as a scent, and to follow that scent.  It is only in that scent and as a 
scent that I will be able to do justice to the animal.  This is the only way that I can live up to my 
responsibilities to the animal.  My (respons)ibility to the animal is to reveal how its dominant metaphors 
stink. These responsibilities will be exactly those that have been passed over, repressed, and resist 
domination by the dichotomy of human/animal.  This is the task of representing animality otherwise.  And 
this otherwise will be perennial. 
The discussion thus far has presented an outline, a vision, which has drawn heavily on the works 
of three writers.  Merleau-Pony, Levinas, and Derrida form an enigmatic constellation of positions along 
the impossible experience of aporia that betrays the animal.  They seem to form a strange triad of vectors 
that result in an equilibrium of tensions.  As I see it, this balance, that I cautiously bring together here, 
would be disrupted if I did not include all three.  Yet what I highlight in these authors comes at the 
expense of other aspects of their thought.  Their relationship itself presents the unnegotiable terrain that 
animals thrive on, and again, I mean this literally.  That is, the aspects of their theories that I am focusing 
on form an aporetic relationship that becomes inseparable from that experienced in an animal encounter.  
I hope to present certain aspects of each thinker in a fashion that will cultivate the most fertile ground for 
animals, and thus, for animal tracking.  This will involve maximizing the tensions between them and 
highlighting ways in which they problematize each other.  This will fortify the impasse of the double bind, 
of having to represent the unrepresentability of the animal, in order for us to betray the animal.  If not for 
the impasse that their interrelation forms we might think we have arrived at the animal.  But the animal’s 
arrival signals its departure.   
I hope to present specific manifestations in their work so that when reading one will be forced to 
live through the aporia22 of the human-animal relation.  For an aporia can only be lived through.  An 
aporia is an impasse. It barricades thought.  It is thought’s limit.  But this ‘what cannot be thought’ can be 
‘experienced’, if I dare to make a tentative and all too problematic distinction between thought and 
experience.  It is the experience or living through of the impossible.  It cannot be thought through, which I 
am trying to do here, because it is precisely what stops thought.  The ‘living through’ happens ‘before’ 
thought arrives.  However, it is impossible to separat e ‘thought’ from ‘experience’(for instance, no matter 
how thetic thought is, it is still an experience). This impossible dichotomy, of so-called thought from so-
called experience, arrives with reason to the impasse, and my articulation of the impasse here is no 
exception, which only serves to reiterate the impossibility of thinking through it.  Aporias must be lived 
through for another reason.  There is no choice in the matter.  The choice of the personal thinking self is 
blocked at the door of the aporia.  The experience of the aporia cannot properly be said to happen to the 
self.  It happens before one can choose—they must choose.  It is unavoidable (like, for instance, the 
aporia of death).  Yet the experience of aporias  could not be closer or more rightfully belong to the self 
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(also like death).  It is at this intimate encounter, the experience of the impossible, that one will have an 
encounter with the alterity of the animal.  It is here where the human-animal border will be breached and 
the self will be inspired by the other.  This encounter will prove fruitful on a tracking venture.  This is why I 
am presenting Mereau-Ponty, Derrida and Levinas’s theory in an aporetic arrangement.  This is in the 
hopes of getting the reader to experience the impossible, the animal’s otherness.  This will involve 
maximizing the specific tensions between their theories in a fashion that parallels an animal encounter.   
In spite of, or because of, the differences of these three thinkers, they seem to form a strange 
unity.  However, this unity is anything but stable.  It is a tentative, precarious, abysmal, unrepresentable 
unity that rebels relentlessly against any unification.  It could be said that all three offer a similar 
conception of alterity that will aid us in being responsible to animal others.  This generilizable conception 
of alterity, which is the antithesis of generalization and conception, is only imaginable with selective 
readings of each author.  Further, this fragile unity is in some way an amalgamation that does a violence 
to the absolute singularity of each of the authors and their writings.  A singularity that cannot be captured 
by the singular-multiple binary, which would see singularity as one within a series.  But it is here, in their 
(un)generalizable singularity that we will find the tentative general conception of alterity. Moreover, each 
of these authors on their own, and within their own works, is by no means homogenous.  Furthermore, if 
all three did offer a generality, it would undermine their respective projects.  The tentative precarious unity 
I am importing into this discussion is a unity that cuts across any binarism of the specific and the general.  
In my selective readings I will present certain ways of re-imagining, tracking and negotiating animals.  All 
three offer rich condensations of paradoxes.  And when one brings these three thinkers together into a 
tenuous constellation, these paradoxes proliferate.  This is ideal territory for having an ‘authentic’ 
interaction with an animal, right within the text itself.  Because, as will soon be made more (un)clear, it is 
out of these paradoxes that transcendence of humanity is possible, where there can be contact with the 
animal.  It is through the paradoxes that originary meaning about the animal will be born/give birth.  Within 
the text there will be contact with the animal ‘outside’.  However, this cannot be understood in terms of 
knowledge.  That is, in terms of the oppositions of inside/outside, imminence/transcendence, 
metaphorical/literal.  This contact outside the human with the animal antedates, or is on the hither side of 
these oppositions—but it is within these oppositions that we will inevitably understand this contact.  This 
is why the animal encounter within this text will be understood as (not) only metaphorical.    
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Composed Flesh: Merleau-Ponty and Animal Refractions 
 
 
 
The mucus is an interior which could not be more intimately me, yet which evades my mastery.23 
The bodies interiority is ungraspable in so far as it is unopposable to any other thing, and is 
refractory to concepts of containment and dissipation, penetration and recollection, visibility and 
form. To des cribe the indeterminacy of the mucous as unrepresentable would be to miss the point.  
The mucous is a continuation of the body beyond its existence as a phenomenon or an 
indistinguishable contiguity and porosity of interiority and skin.24  
     Vasseleu, Textures of Light.: 
 
As soon as the baby is born, the first thing the mother okapi does is to clean it off.  She licks off the 
blood and mucous so that enemies cannot smell it.  Then she hides the baby in a safe place in the 
underbrush.25 
Schlein. 
 
‘These are the tracks of the animal,’ they said.  ‘These are the tracks we should follow.’  26 
       Johnston’s Pygmy guides.   
 
 
 
In the dominant western tradition the human -nonhuman relation has become one of a detached 
subject acting as a disinterested spectator removed from the objectified non-human.  Here, in what 
Merleau-Ponty called the “analytic attitude”, the subject, which has the distance necessary to re-flect, is 
removed from the non-human that appears as inert, alien, meaningless matter.  Nature becomes a totality 
of homogeneous things that are laid out before us.  It is no wonder that a popular conception of nature is 
as a spectacle to be gazed at behind the lens of a camera, or through the cage at the zoo.  Or more 
telling is the figure of nature as a resource whose only meaning is in its usefulness for humans.  Here, the 
relation to the non-human is one of knowing.  The non-human is striped of its alterity and becomes 
determinate.  The human subject is a reasoning disembodied spectator with a vantage from everywhere, 
God’s perspective, which amounts to a vantage from nowhere. In this dualistic schema, which has a 
strong Cartesian lineage, the emphasis is on separation and disjuncture.  Merleau-Ponty's writing offers 
an alternative to this dichotomy of hum an from nonhuman.  Merleau-Ponty suggests that all perceptual 
experience, be it ‘mental’ or ‘physical’, is bodily, and dependent on the body-world interaction.   
Merleau-Ponty positions his corporeal being in opposition to both the rationalists and empiricists’ 
conceptions of perception.  The rationalists posit that perception is the action of an autonomous mind 
made of pure mental substance acting as an external spectator using its logic and reflection.  The 
empiricists hold that perception is the side effect of the body which is an instrumental object made of pure 
matter. Merleau-Ponty’s account, in contrast, emphasizes the primordial embeddedness of a 
participating, situated, corporeal subject intertwined with, and dependent on, the other, including a valued 
nonhuman other.  But, what is the most valuable about Merleau -Ponty’s account is that this tenuous 
conjuncture of the self and other is not at the expense of alterity.  For Merleau-Ponty the perceiver is part 
of the perceived world by means of a dialogue (which includes the world of language, history and 
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sociality).  However, a dialogue also requires a separation.  Merleau-Ponty elucidates this disjunction with 
his sustained critique of the homogenizing effect of dualisms that would wish to abolish it. 
In the Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty gives us a new articulation of a world that is 
pre-objective, and of which we are apart of.  He writes: 
[T]he sensible is nothing but a vague beckoning… …Thus a sensible datum which is on 
the point of being felt sets a kind of muddled problem  for my body to solve.  I must find 
the attitude which will provide it with the means of becoming determinate, of showing up 
as blue [if looking at the blue sky, for instance].  I must find the reply to a question that is 
obscurely expressed.  And yet I do so only when I am invited by it, my attitude is never 
sufficient to make me see blue or really touch a hard surface.  The sensible gives back to 
me what I lent to it, but this is only what I took from it in the first place.  As I contemplate 
the blue in the sky I am not set over against it as an acosmic subject; I do not possess it 
in thought, or spread out towards it some idea of blue such as might reveal the secret of 
it, I abandon my self to it and plunge into its myst ery, it ‘thinks itself within me’.27  
 
In the Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty offers a new schema that articulates a 
relationship which is pre-subjective and pre-objective.  Both subject and object presuppose and are 
dependent upon this originary relation, a relation that highlights the primordial interdependence of these 
two realms, an interdependence, Merleau -Ponty claims, is not at the cost of difference.  These two 
realms, and their supposed separation as found in Cartesian dualism, only arise with the arrival of 
thought.  With thought, comes nature as meaningless object.  But thought arrives late.  Before thought 
gets there human and non-human are already in a relation of embrace and mutual unfolding.  This is an 
anonymous pre-personal dialogue with a ‘world’ of which ‘we’ are creative members.  This pre-personal 
dialogue is pre-rational.  And this ‘pre’ of the ‘pre’-rational cannot be understood in terms of the rational.  
When reason comes to the scene the Cartesian schism seems to congeal and fissure.  But if we are to 
give voice to the non-human in a way other than as a valueless object, we must bring this pre-rational 
relation into reason.  Merleau-Ponty suggests we have a responsibility to do so. 28  But at what cost?  He 
also mentions a violence in making the pre-rational rational.29  In Merleau-Ponty we see the double bind 
mentioned above.  For Merleau-Ponty, the only way we can meet our responsibility to the animal, to live 
through the impossible double bind, is through a corporeal relation that problematizes any conception of a 
disembodied, intellect, reason, concept, mind, consciousness, thought, and so on.  Yet this 
problematization should not be seen as a demonization or call for the abandonment of reason, and the 
like.  On the contrary, Merleau-Ponty sees it as an opportunity to re-own reason.  In this way he points out 
what the Cartesian binary represses and masks.  The disruption of dualism serves to articulate the 
legitimate and contextalized experiences of a reasoning body -subject.  It is in the pre-personal embodied 
dialogue that the Cartesian conceptual schema will be disrupted.  It is only out of the lived embodied 
interspecies relation that an originary account of the animal will emerge.   
There is a very important shift that takes place from Merleau -Ponty’s early works, including the 
Phenomenology of Perception, to that of his later works, such as The Visible and the Invisible and Eye 
and Mind.  In a working note from 1959 Merleau-Ponty writes: “The problems posed in Ph. P. 
[Phenomenology of Perception] are insoluble because I started there from the ‘consciousness’-‘object’ 
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distinction—…and the purported ‘objective condition…is a way of expressing and noting an event of the 
order of brute or wild being which, ontologically, is primary.  This event is that a given visible properly 
disposed (a body) hollows itself out an invisible sense [‘sens ’].“30  Langer asks: 
What are we to make of this cryptic note?  Has not Merleau-Ponty at every step of his 
analysis in the Phenomenology [of Perception] endeavored precisely to overturn the 
traditional distinction between ‘consciousness’ and ‘object’ by disclosing incarnate 
subjectivity as a third kind of being which is irreducible to either consciousness or 
objective body?  Has he not taken pains to show – in his analysis of habitual behaviors, 
for example – that the body -subject incorporates the world’s structures into its own 
space?  Has he not insisted that the world is not to be regarded as a totality of objects, 
nor subject as a spectator consciousness surveying the lot?  Has he not emphasized 
repeatedly in the Phenomenology that there is a genesis of subject and object in pre-
reflective perceptual experience?  Has he not throughout his study of perception drawn 
attention to the distortions  stemming from our adherence to the classical distinctions? 
Has he not consistently attempted to illuminate the primordial experience which 
antedates any such distinctions? 31   
 
If we answer all these questions with a yes, as Langer does, and I would have to agree, then what is 
Merleau-Ponty concerned about in his working note? 
In the Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty took as his starting point the traditional 
distinctions of consciousness and object (the so-called objective body and the world).  He then went 
about demonstrating that all lived experience, be it ‘mental’ or ‘physical’ is the result of a pre-objective, 
pre-subjective, pre-personal, pre-rational dialogue.  However, the very conditions of possibility of this 
dialogue remain somewhat dormant in the Phenomenology of Perception.  He does not fully explore the 
genesis of the dialogue.  Rather than elaborating the abysmal, paradoxical, pre-dichotomous, originating 
field, out of which are born all the dichotomies, he presupposes the distinction of a perceiving subject and 
perceived object.  Certainly, the originary field of what he calls ‘brute being’ or ‘wild being’ (his use of the 
terms ‘brute’ and ‘wild’ here attest to the untamed and unruly character of being before it is fully known.  
Further, his appeal to animal tropes here is extremely important.  This importance is compounded by the 
fact that his appeal to brutes happens at the precise location in the text that proves to be the most brutish.  
It was brute or wild being that became unruly and caused havoc in The Phenomenology of Perception.   It 
required taming in his later texts.  This convergence of animal as vehicle and substance of the text is 
what Lippit referred to above as animetaphor.  This moment ‘in’ Merleau-Ponty’s text was an animal 
encounter, the transgressing of the impossible threshold between metaphor and literal, human and 
animal, and so forth.  It is also astonishing, though not coincidental, that we caught this glimpse of the 
animal, in his text, in a working note, and in my text, in parenthesis.  The animal we are tracking will 
always make a(n) (dis)appearance oblique to the central focus.  And this is not the only parenthetical 
peek at an animal that we get in this paper).  was present throughout the Phenomenology of Perception.  
However, it remained rather unelaborated.  It is not so much a matter of his earlier works being ‘wrong’ or 
incompatible with that of his later ones.  Rather, the shift in focus and starting points in his later works 
eliminates some possible confusions (some unruliness to conception) that might arise in his earlier ones.  
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The shift is from seeing the body as a locus from which we perceive experience to seeing the body as an 
index within the always already underway perceiving-perceived ‘experience’.    
In the unfinished, posthumously published The Visible and the Invisible: Followed by Working 
Notes we find Merleau-Ponty taking up the task of going back to the brute silent being of the primordial 
originating experience-source.  This is the source of the very distinctions found in reflection, such as 
‘source’ and ‘experience’.  This is that source that cannot be recaptured by reflection, due to the 
necessary distance required by reflection.  This source precedes and exceeds knowing.  However, 
paradoxically this is the source that must be recaptured in reflection, as futile as this attempt may be.  It is 
this very paradoxical futility that allows for the possibility of experiencing the impossible, the new, the 
other.  It is only paradoxical from within the dom ain of the self and the same with its quest to make sense 
of the other.  But this is the region that is to be transcended.  It is the experience-source of the paradox, 
at the seams of reason, that is the birth of new meaning out of, not separate from, the old. 32  This paradox 
is the brute being which Merleau-Ponty is after and which he names flesh.  
 Flesh, as developed in The Visible and the Invisible, is the inscription of otherness within 
sameness. Flesh always has an irreducible reversibility.  That is, it is always both otherness and 
sameness, and can switch between, sensing and sensed, subject and object, self and other, ideality and 
materiality, and so on.  This reversibility of the flesh is a ‘being’s’ ability to fold back onto itself.  An 
example of this reversibility is when one feels one’s hand with the other.  Both hands feel each other 
‘within’ but are also felt by each other from the ‘outside’.  In this experience of the feeling-felt there is an 
inextricable intertwining, yet a divergency.  One can only inhabit the touching of one hand at a time.  
When one hand is touching the other becomes the touched.  But this touching-touched is reversible.  Out 
of this reversibility one can touch touching.  What is important here is that one is not reducible to the other 
and vice versa.  There is a non -coincidence of the feeling-felt.  There is a type of ‘unity’ with internal 
divergence.  One cannot touch one hand without the other being touched.  The touching of one hand 
needs the touched.  It is only through the touched that the touching is born.  The touched is born from the 
touching that is drawn through it.  As well, that which is touching must in turn be touchable.  It must take 
its place in the world of the tangible.  Here the body always has the capacity for reversibility.  However, as 
was noted earlier when discussing the shift from Merleau-Ponty’s earlier to later work, the body does not 
perceive, rather it forms, is a momentary crystallization, is a term, or an index within the reversibility of the 
flesh.  The body only arises and is significant as perceived, or perceiving out of the perceiving-perceived 
flesh.   Merleau-Ponty is here exploring how it is that corporeality manifests form within the double 
sensation of the reversibility of the flesh, the crossing over from feeling to felt.  Reversibility implicates the 
subject in the object and the object is in part constitutive of the subject and vice versa.  The name flesh 
seems to do the impossible and capture both the objective (substantive, stuff of the world/self) and the 
subjective (situated, experiential and embodiedness of the world/self).      
 This self-sensing characteristic of the flesh cannot be understood within the traditional 
conceptions of self/other, human/world, and anthropocentric/biocentric (hence its tremendous importance 
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to environmental politics that often employs these terms).  On the contrary, these terms are what the flesh 
disturbs.  It becomes impossible to draw a line between these oppositions, which, paradoxically, are the 
opposite of being in opposition.  As Dillon explains: 
Far from the anthropomorphizing some have taken this [self-sensing of the flesh] to be, it 
is actually a decentering of human reflexivity: our flesh is incorporated within worldly 
flesh; human reflexivity is but a phase of worldly reflexivity and is intrinsically mediated 
through contact with other beings .  Alterity, the distance which alienates us from 
ourselves and other beings in the feedback loop of reflexivity, is here conceived as 
essential to the intimacy of self-identification: we sense ourselves through the world (e.g. 
we touch things only by being touched by them), but since we are ourselves worldly, this 
is the world sensing itself through that part of itself which we are.  Worldly self-affection is 
the core idea of ecological ontology.33  
 
 Extending Merleau-Ponty’s conception of flesh to the question of the animal, this is precisely how 
humanity is dependent on animality.  It is animality that infuses difference into the human.  The animal 
puts the human out of phase with itself thus creating the distance necessary for human reflection, 
perception, phenomena, sensing, and most important for this paper—articulation—which is why there 
must be an animal in this text.  If not for the alterity of other animals and the world that ‘we’ are apart of, 
‘we’ would not inhabit the part of the world, and not the only one, that is self-sensing.  
For Merleau-Ponty, the reversibility of touching can be, in a way, generalized to all the other 
senses.  For instance, there is a reversibility of seeing with the seen, invisible with the visible. When in 
comes to visibility, reversibility is not as easily understood as with touch.  For instance, in traditional 
conceptions of vision, especially in mainstream representations of contemporary science the object is at a 
distance from the subject (although this is a gross generalization, in fact, many critiques of mainstream 
conceptions of vision have be put forth by scientists34).  Merleau-Ponty wants to show how the seer’s 
visibility conditions vision itself, and the reverse.  That is, he wants to describe how the flesh implicates 
the subject’s vision in the object and the object is in part constitutive of what the subject sees.  To 
illustrate visibility as flesh Merleau-Ponty often looks at the vision of a painter.  The painter vision is able 
to transform new meaning, which is invisible, into the visible realm.  As Langer observes in Merleau-
Ponty: 
Painters transform the visible from within it through a seeing which is at the chiasma of 
eye and mind.  The painting of a self-portrait is an example par excellence of the ‘coiling 
over’ of vision which enables a new meaning to emerge from vertical Being.  
Simultaneously seer and seen, the painter belongs to the fabric of the visible and folds 
that fabric over so that a fresh meaning is hollowed out.  The painter’s vision is a seeing 
from within the visible itself – as such self-portrayal most readily shows.  It thus becomes 
understandable that our own vision likewise ‘installs’ itself in things…35  
  
 The hollowing out of the invisible from within the visible produces the coiling over or wave 
formation.  That is, as has been said, reversibility is the ability to turn back and forth between the 
experience of perceiving and perceived.  This turning back is the coiling over which entails a hollowing 
out.  What is key is when this wave folds over itself, the ‘inside’ ‘surface’ (the invisible, meaning, ideality or 
perceiving side) is hollowed out without a hole in brute being.  A hole would ent ail the disembodiment of 
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the subject from the object.  Paradoxically, it would allow for the distance necessary for an objectifying 
gaze that could grasp and appropriate the other.  It is only through an embrace, with no hole, that the 
alterity of the other can be preserved.  The two sides are intertwined yet divergent.  Perceiving in this 
wave trope figures on the ‘inside’ and is invisible because it has an intimacy and primacy to the visible.  It 
‘precedes’ the appearance of visibility, which arrives late, hence the seen’s exteriority.  The dimension of 
height in the wave is its sameness, the visible, what is known.  The height is the result of many corporeal 
sedimentations.  As the body-subject learns, and what is known increases, the self’s sameness grows up, 
as a mound of sand raises with each new deposit.   The sediment layers of the wave are the corporeal 
habituations.  Out of the folding over of this sameness will come the other from ‘within’ the self as a 
dehiscence. In the embrace of the wave the contours of the sensing beckons the sensed as the sensed 
solicits this beckoning.  The wave builds on, and is another trope for, the relation of subject and object, 
human and animal, and so on, as was the trope of the flesh.  The chiasm of the wave can be seen as its 
inside-outside surface.  Out of the chiasm of the flesh is the dehiscence of meaning, whose play gives 
birth to separation and similarity, for instance, that of the human and the animal.  It is the flesh that is 
before this meaning and sustains it from behind.   
The coiling over of the painter’s vision is not limited to self-portraits.  Merleau -Ponty points out 
that many fifteenth century Flemish paintings (and many others) contain a convex mirror that includes the 
painter’s reflection of him or herself painting.  This highlights the impossibility of distinguish between what 
sees and what is seen, what paints and what is painted.36  Similarly, Merleau-Ponty explains (while 
quoting Marchand): “so many painters have said that things look at them…  ‘In a forest, I have felt many 
times over that it was not I who looked at the forest.  Some days I felt that the trees were looking at me, 
were speaking to me….  I was there, listing….I think that the painter must be penetrated by the universe 
and not want to penetrate it.’”37  This reversibility of vision is not a pantheism.  There is a type of 
asymmetry in this reversibility (the question of this asymmetry will become important in the comparison of 
Merleau-Ponty’s work with that of Levinas below).  This type of asymmetry, or non-coincidence in 
reversibility, is explored here where Merleau-Ponty states reversibility is: 
always immanent and never realized in fact.  My left hand is always on the verge of 
touching my right hand touching things, but I never reach coincidence; the coincidence 
eclipses at the moment of realization, and one of two things always occurs: either my 
right hand really passes over to the rank of touched, but then its hold on the world is 
interrupted; or it retains its hold on the world, but then I really do not touch it—my hand 
touching [or the tree seeing me], I palpate with my left hand only its outer covering…. I 
am always on the same side of my body; it presents itself to me in one invariable 
perspective…[but]…this is not a failure. 38  
 
This is not a failure for Merleau -Ponty because this is the non-coincidence, the ‘hiatus’, the present 
absence that is incompletely ‘unified’ in the flesh.  But what is this quasi-unity like when it is not one’s own 
hand but another person or an animal one is sensing?  For Merleau-Ponty the division of self and other, 
and human and animal form a new arrangement when considered as flesh.  The question of reversibility 
of others in the flesh needs more exploration, but first the flesh itself must be fleshed out.  
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Characterizing visibility as flesh, and vision as that of a painter, shows the limits of the dominant 
conceptions of scientific vision.  At least this challenged the dominant conceptions of science in Merleau-
Ponty’s time.  Much writing, for instance, in the field of critical science studies, as has already been 
mentioned, has problimatized these conceptions, however, they still remain quite dominant.  His 
characterization of vision shows the limits of vision from above, which would want to posit, posses and 
penetrate the object for manipulation, prediction and control.  As Merleau-Ponty says: “Science 
manipulates things and gives up living in them.”39  To conceive of vision as a disembodied spectator 
omnisciently gazing at a distant object gets one sidetracked away from the primordial embrace which 
generates and sustains visibility. 
 In the following passage, Vasseleu summarizes well the generative properties of the chiasm well.  
Keep in mind that it is this chiasm to which the scientific posture, of treating everything as an object-in-
general, would become anesthetized.  It is to this generative ‘source’ in the flesh that objectification must 
acknowledge its debt:  
The challenge of the chiasm for Merleau-Ponty is to gather, if incompletely, what comes 
of nothing, what comes out of the void.  Chiasm is the name Merleau-Ponty gives to the 
motion of perpetual dehiscence, in which perception is understood as a being in 
momentum.  This is a departure from perception understood as an object of subjective 
synthesis or a pre-given schema determining the recognition of things.  Merleau-Ponty 
makes full use of dehiscence as a generative term, taken in biology to refer to the 
splitting apart of fruits, seed pods, or organs to bring forth a flesh which differs from but is 
of their flesh40.  There is an interiority of ‘being within flesh’ that comes to the surface in 
the chiasm, as an opening of the perceptual world.  The arising of sense is a ‘fleshing out’ 
of embodied existence, with flesh disclosing its (in)coherence or ‘carnal meaning’ in its 
differentiation of itself. 41  
 
For Merleau-Ponty language can also be understood in terms of the folding over and dehiscence 
of the flesh.  That is, language and materiality have the same chiasmic relation as that described by 
Vasseleu above, with all the parallels in her metaphor to that of the mirror tain, magma, painting and the 
wave.  Here language itself is in an equivocal flesh relation with the so-called signified.  It is only out of 
the old language that the new will emerge.  Here the transcendence of language, the import of new 
meaning, is an immanent transcendence.  It never leaves language.  Language is not something to be 
left, or something that could be left.  Paradoxically, the new erupts out of the coiling over, without a hole, 
of the old.  There is never a clean break with old language.  One is dependent on the old, even to posit it 
in opposition, for the birth of the new.  Moreover, a word and the signified form that chiasmic relation 
where they cannot be either separated nor collapsed.     
Merleau-Ponty further elaborates how the opposites of language/object and self/other are not in 
opposition at all.  He posits instead an anonymous intercorporeality that precedes the division of the me 
and not me. 
It is said that the colours, the tactile reliefs given to the other, are for me an absolute 
mystery, forever inaccessible.  This is not completely true; for me to have not an idea, an 
image, nor a representation, but as it were the imminent experience of them, it suffices 
that I look at the landscape, that I speak of it with someone.  Then, through the 
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concordant operation of his body and my own, what I see passes into him, this individual 
green of the meadow under my eyes invades his vision without quitting my own, I 
recognize in my green his green… There is no problem here of the alter ego because it is 
not I who sees, not he who sees, because an anonymous visibility inhabits both of us, a 
vision in general, in virtue of the primordial property that belongs to the flesh… 42  
 
 In La Nature: Notes, Cours du College de France43 Merleau-Ponty explores this anonymous 
intercorporeality in interspecies relations.  There he proposes that the animal is a “loophole” that refutes 
and rebels against the Cartesian dichotomies. 44  His appeal to the animal as a loophole parallels Lippits 
description of the animal as an animetaphor.  The animal’s absolute alterity is the threshold or loophole 
through which difference is transported into the human.  It is the animal’s irreducible otherness that rebels 
against human conception.  To allow this rebellion to flourish, to be attentive to the anonymous 
interspecies corporeal dialogue, Merleau-Ponty proposes a harmony of physiognomy, or bodily styles.  To 
reach this harmony Elizabeth Behnke45, drawing on La Nature, suggests the use of Merleau-Ponty’s 
conception of an improvisational compartment in interspecies situations.  This improvisational posture 
represents a shift from the project of knowing animals, as if they could be known, as if the known should 
be valorized, to the project of interspecies dialogue.  A shift from docile being to brute being.  For 
Merleau-Ponty and Behnke this compartment is improvisational in that it is not determinate.  Yet, this 
does not mean that anything is allowable.  Rather, what is required must emerge from one’s participation 
in a shared interspecies field.  The shift from knowing, which is the determinable, as such, to that of 
improvisation, allows one to be attentive to the echoes within the interkinesthetic field—the pre-human 
pre-animal flesh.  Once one realizes that they represent the impossible position of being a product of this 
field, yet also a co-producer, there is a chance to resist the imperialism of human knowledge over the 
animal’s otherness.  That is, one can meet their responsibilities in this co-production and create a 
different story of human-animal interaction.   
   It is also noteworthy, while on the topic of responsibility in the creative, generative, and 
productive role in the flesh, to look back at Merleau-Ponty’s painting trope for the flesh.  By using painting 
to configure the primordial relation, the flesh, Merleau-Ponty places a mimesis, the act of representation, 
at the origin, thus installing an absence in the heart of presence.  By making the origin a copy the origin 
will always be ever receding, thus wild—not fully capturable.  It will contain an absence.  It will point 
beyond itself and be open to otherness.  This positive absence, which is not nothing, within painting and 
within the flesh, is what inscribes difference—the different, new, other—within reflection, the same, the 
visible and the old.  As an originating trope, painting problematizes the opposition of origin/copy, 
creation/duplication as well as many other oppositions.  Painting, as a trope for the flesh, captures the 
uncapturable wildness of brute being.  And it is the brutes that we are after, thus Merleau-Ponty flesh has 
tremendous importance for our goal of representing animal’s alterity.  
 It is also interesting to note that the African ‘explorer’ Sir Harry Johnston who was ‘discovering’ 
the okapi was a painter from a young age.  In fact, his main role on many scientific expeditions was as an 
illustrator of scientific diagrams.46  Here we have the quintessential creative act of painting paradoxically 
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at the heart of the quintessential act of discovery.  This only serves to highlight the inextricable ambiguity, 
rather than dichotomy, of creation and discover.  It also emphasis the non-oppositional nature of these 
terms.  For instance, creative acts do not have to be seen as a threat to scientific discover, to be hidden 
and repressed.  On the contrary, they should be seen as augmenting and facilitating discovery.  The 
same could be said about the role of fantasy and imagination in science.  Initially Johnston believed the 
okapi was a unicorn. 47  Traditionally fantasy has been conceived as the antithesis of scientific truth.  
However, here we see these two terms in an equivocal rather than oppositional relation.          
 The reversibility of the flesh, the folding over or invagination of brute being which allows the 
invisible to become visible, is only possible because that which perceives, sees, touches and hears, is of 
the same ilk as that which is perceived, seen, felt and heard.  They are of the same flesh.  The perceiving 
and the perceived are mutually dependent; there is no room for a disembodied antonymous 
consciousness made of pure mental substance.  The sensed and the sentient share a commonality which 
is the flesh. “Where are we to put the limit between the body and the world, since the world is flesh?” asks 
Merleau-Ponty.48  They are the obverse and reverse sides of each other.49  Or better, using a metaphor 
that Alphonso Lingis draws out of Merleau -Ponty’s conception of the flesh, each ‘side’ is like the always 
shifting incomprehensible surfaces of the Mobius strip.50  
 Within the flesh the inability to take up the other’s perspective, to sense from their side, is not a 
threat or an opposition juxtaposed to the self (a point that perhaps differs from Levinas conception of 
alterity).  Rather, their alterity serves as a resource in reversibility.  Merleau-Ponty explains: “I borrow 
myself from others; I create others from my own thoughts.”51  Elsewhere he similarly adds: “Now why 
would this generality [of sentience of self and world, in general, found in the flesh], that constitutes the 
unity of my body, not open it to other bodies?  The handshake too is reversible; I can feel myself touched 
as well and at the same time as touching…. Why would not the synergy exist among different organisms, 
if it is possible within each?  This is possible as soon as we no longer make belongingness to one same 
‘consciousness’ the primordial definition of sensibility.”52  Rather, Merleau-Ponty would have sensibility be 
the return of the sensible upon itself in the mutual adherence of sentience and sensed.53    
 One way of understanding my extension of Merleau-Ponty’s work into my discussion of animality 
is to see the parallels of his navigation of the impossible relation of the visible to the invisible (sameness 
and otherness, perceiving and perceived, and so on) in my navigation of the human and the animal 
relation.  He offers an incredible account of the impossibility of a unity of the terms as well as the 
impossibility of being separated.  So too, have I attempted to tenuously capture these impossibilities 
regarding the human and the animal.  One of many implications of this paralleling is the shift in 
orientations, that was spelled out above, from Merleau-Ponty’s earlier to later works.  Rather than 
presupposing the distinction of the human from the animal, I would like to see these two terms as already 
arising out of, exceeded and sustained by a pre-human, pre-animal primordial relation of quasi-
asymmetrical reversible flesh.  Here, the human and the animal are no longer seen as being in 
opposition.  Rather, it is through the animal that the human arises.  This gives a new conception of the 
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human, with the animal not (only) seen as a threat to be mastered, captured, determined, studied, or 
conquered.  Rather, the animal other is the irreducible ambiguity and alterity required for the reflexivity of 
the human flesh.  In this ambiguity there will always be animality in humanity and vice versa.  Understood 
as flesh, the relationship, which is not really a relationship, with another creature is one that precedes, 
exceeds and sustains any attempt to demarcate and divvy up human from animal, and the resultant 
ontology into which these categories inevitably coagulate.  
  For Merleau-Ponty the animal is revealed within the flesh.  However, as with all revealing there 
are both sides of the betrayal.  Even as flesh, which is the inscription of otherness in the same, the other 
is appropriated.  Merleau-Ponty appeals to animality somewhat tacitly in his constant reorientation of 
docile being into a brute being—being as flesh.  As has been mentioned above, he also explicitly appeals 
to animals in such works as La Nature.  This appropriation, although being of the greatest violence to 
animals, is not something that can be avoided.  There will always be an equivocation to betraying the 
animal.  That is, you will betray it in both senses: revealing it, and doing it a disservice by not leaving it as 
other, but appropriating it, even if for exposure.  However, even though animal appropriation cannot be 
avoided, it should be avoided at all cost.  And when this fails, which it will always inevitably do, it should 
be acknowledged.  Merleau-Ponty does not acknowledge this failure when it comes to animals.  I see 
Merleu-Ponty appropriating animality in a way similar to what Luce Irigaray identified as an appropriation 
of femininity and maternity in Merleau-Ponty’s flesh.   
 Irigaray, similar to many other feminists who have taken issue with Merleau-
Ponty,54acknowledges a great debt to his work.  However, she challenges Merleau-Ponty’s conception of 
the flesh in several key ways.  For instance, rather than conceiving of the flesh as a reversibility akin to 
that of the double sensation of the two hands grasping each other, Irigaray offers a touching that is 
refractory to the grasping of reversibility.  Not everywhere on the body can be touched, thus, not every 
touch can be touched touching.  Irigaray points to the touching of two hands and fing ers, when the fingers 
are extended, placed together with palms stationary and continuously pressed against each other.  This 
touching is a sensibility that goes further than the notion of the flesh in challenging the thingification and 
coherence of the grasping of the double sensation of Merleau-Ponty.  Thus, it is more resilient against the 
ontologizing forces of understanding.  It is more rebellious to the human trainers wishing to tame the 
beast.     
 Iragaray further challenges Merleau-Ponty by suggesting that in spite of his subordination of 
vision there still remains in his work a primacy of visibility.  This primacy is susceptible to a phallo-
logocentric economy.  Irigaray places the primacy on touch.  This is best exemplified, she argues, by the 
possibility of blindness, but the impossibility of conceiving of a similar affliction of touch.  A total loss of 
touch would result in a total loss of consciousness.  She argues that subjectivity presupposes and is 
founded in tangibility.  Merleau-Ponty fails to acknowledge this primacy, and his debt to touch.  Irigaray 
posits a touching that is not susceptible to any division of visibility/invisibility.  Iragaray’s example of the 
tangible invisibility, that is beyond the visible and the invisible, is that of the lips.  These are the lips of the 
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mouth and the labia.  The touching of the lips together is not susceptible to a visible morphology.  
Consequently, they disrupt the distinction of the visible and the invisible.  This challenges the division, as 
equivocal and ambiguous as it may be, in Merleau-Ponty’s double sensation of the hands, between 
sensed and sentient, and things and ideas.  Further, the lips also disrupt the dichotomy of interior and 
exterior by establishing bodily being as a threshold or passage,55 further insulating the body against 
subject/object division. 
Increasing this insulation is Irigaray’s concept of mucosity.  The mucus of the lips, and other 
tangible invisibles, further refracts dichotomies.  As Grosz explains: 
 The tactile is related by Irigaray to the concept of the mucus, which always marks the 
passage from inside to outside, which accompanies and lubricates the mutual touching of 
the body’s parts and regions.  The mucus is neither a subjective touching or the toucher 
nor the objectivity of the touched but the indeterminacy of any distance between them.  It 
escapes control, not being subject to the kind of voluntary slippage by which the touching 
hand becomes the touched.  She suggests that the mucus may represent the 
toucher/touched indeterminacy more precisely than one hand grabbing the other.56  
 
Mucus’ refractive ability does not end there.  It is useful to revisit one of the quotes that open this section.   
As Vasseleu explained: 
The mucus is an interior which could not be more intimately me, yet which evades my 
mastery.57 The bodies interiority is ungraspable in so far as it is unopposable to any other 
thing, and is refractory to concepts of containment and dissipation, penetration and 
recollection, visibility and form. To describe the indeterminacy of the mucous as 
unrepresentable would be to miss the point.  The mucous is a continuation of the body 
beyond its existence as a phenomenon or an indistinguishable contiguity and porosity of 
interiority and skin.58 
 
As Whitford points out 59 Irigaray’s mucus is neither strictly male or female, solid nor fluid, subject 
nor object, visible nor invisible, and cannot be detached.  Thus, is not readily incorporated into male 
sexual fantasy, with its objectification and mastery.  Mucus is always to some extent open, and therefore 
defiant to the closure necessary for control.  Likewise (in a rather appropriating move of my own.  That is, 
my appropriation of Irigaray’s work into my question of the animal still recapitulates the appropriation of 
the feminine) a topology of animality as mucosity would also defy objectification and control.  It would also 
allow for another visibility of the human and animal.  As Vasseleu suggests, “[t]he blink maintains the eye 
as mucus, as a latency which, while not of the visible, resuscitates the eye as a body passage, or a 
reserve in which another vision can begin.”60  
Irigaray’s reconception of the flesh as a mucosity becomes extremely important in her look at 
sexual difference.  For Merleau-Ponty the flesh, as chiasm, is un-opposable, it is the medium where 
oppositions arise and become opposed; it is pre-sexed.  It is where (sexual) oppositions can crossover 
and what prevents their collapse.  However, as Irigaray suggests, Merleau -Ponty latently codes the flesh 
with feminine and maternal tropes.  The flesh in its dehiscence of the sentient and the sensed is a 
perpetual pregnancy and birth.  For instance, as Merleau-Ponty says, in a quote that is representative of 
this latent coding elsewhere in his work: "The flesh of the lived body and the world is not inert matter, but 
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perpetual pregnancy, perpetual parturition, generativity and generality, brute essence and brute 
existence."61  The flesh is not pre-sexed, it is implicitly sexed as female, and Merleau-Ponty does not 
acknowledge his debt to and appropriation of the feminine. Within the flesh, this latent femininity figures 
as a lack.  Within the reversibility of the double sensation of the hands there is a reflexivity of sexual 
difference.  Yet, as Irigaray points out woman has no intrinsic propriety of her own.  Woman has always 
existed as a male lacking, which is not a positive existence at all.  Vesseleu writes: 
Irigaray maintains that each being of woman is a materialization that differs in relation 
with itself such that no gathering of the difference is possible… an interior co-existence of 
different being(s) is not divisible phenomenologicallly.  The difference of this interiority is 
a resistance to closure exceeding the (in)coherence of flesh.  Irigaray raises the question 
of whether Merleau-Ponty’s configuration of difference is as radical as he suggests, or 
whether his non-dualist ontology can be criticized for allowing no space for radically other 
modes of existence. 62  
 
 This poses serious problems for any appeal to Merleau-Ponty’s work to explore the radically 
different existence of animals.  Similar to Iragaray’s claim that woman’s existence is always a negation, 
Derrida shows that animals too are always an ontological lack with no intrinsic essence: “there is no 
category of original existence for the animal.”63  For him animals are the essential supplements for what 
does get to exist essentially.  There is a slight solipsistic tendency in the reversibility of the flesh where 
the animal or woman is only the inversion of the human and the man.  Reversibility still insinuates an 
isomorphism of subject and object, man and woman, and human and animal.  This is not to say that 
Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm is a problem that we should or could abandon.  It is a profound articulation of a 
side of the double bind of having to represent the unrepresentiblility of animals.  Further, Merleau-Ponty’s 
location along this double bind is in no way fixed.  This double bind parallels the tremendous problem of 
navigating the relation of ontological difference and species difference.  This ‘problem’ in Merleau-Ponty’s 
work, of allowing no room for radically other modes of existence, is not to be avoided.  This is where one 
might catch the whiff of an animal in the breeze.  Let us swelter in it.  Waft it towards our face.  However, 
and this may be the biggest ‘problem’ with Merleau-Ponty’s flesh, it may smell much worse than he 
suspected.  The smell of flesh is not always pleasant.  I want to show how it can be repulsive.  This leads 
me into my discussion of Derrida and Levinas.  This shift is not to be seen as linear or hierarchical.  Their 
work will in turn lead back to Merleau-Ponty’s.  None of them are in the lead here.  The animal that we are 
tracing is in the lead.  In/between these three thinkers will emerge the trace of the animal as trace.  
 If there is an alterity of the animal that exceeds Merleau-Ponty’s (in)coherence of the flesh it is 
perhaps felt in the look of the animal.  The speculative tone of this hypothesis (in the previous sentence) 
is still not enough to eliminate the appropriation of this alterity.  However, the look of the animal is where I 
will now turn to try and traumatize Merleau-Ponty’s flesh.  I want to rip it apart and let it decay.   
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Decomposing Flesh: The Anti-Phenomenon Phenomenology 
 
 
Indignation over cruelty diminishes in proportion as the victims are less like normal readers, the 
more they are swarthy, “dirty” dago-like.  This throws as much light on the crimes as on the 
spectators.  Perhaps the social schematization of perception in anti-Semites is such that they do 
not see Jews as human beings at all.  The constantly encountered assertion that savages, blacks, 
Japanese are like animals, monkeys for example, is key to the pogrom.  The possibility of the 
pogroms is decided in the moment when the gaze of the fatally-wounded animal falls on a human 
being.  The defiance with which he repels this gaze—“after all, it’s only an animal”—reappears 
irresistibly in cruelties done to human beings, the perpetrators having again and again to reassure 
themselves that it is “only an animal,” because they could never fully believe this even of animals.  
In repressive society the concept of man is itself a parody of divine likeness.  The mechanism of 
“pathic projection” determines that those in power perceive as human only their own reflected 
image, instead of reflecting back the human as precisely what is different.  Murder is thus the 
repeated attempt, by greater madness, to distort the madness of such false perceptions into 
reason: what was not seen as human and yet is human, is made a thing, so that its stirrings can no 
longer refute the manic gaze.64                         
       Theodor Adorno. 
 
 
 The act of animalization anesthetizes one to violence.  It makes one numb to one’s 
responsibilities to the other.  It allows one to stay within the human realm of the same, of phenomenon, of 
knowledge.  The structure of animality from the beginning is that it is that which hides violence.  Thus, any 
unquestioned adoption of animality by an environmentalist only serves to undermine their goals.  As Gary 
Wolfe, quoting from Etienne Balibar, points out “‘every theoretical racism draws upon anthropological 
universals,’ underneath which we find ‘the persistent presence of the same ‘question’: that of the 
difference between humanity and animality’ that is at work in ‘the systematic ‘bestialization’ of individuals 
and racial groups.’”65 Importantly, Wolfe also adds “that even though the discourse of animality and 
species difference may theoretically be applied to an other of whatever type, the consequences of that 
discourse, in institutional terms, fall overwhelmingly on the nonhuman animals.”66  
Responsibility to the other can only come as other, but animalization homogenizes thus 
foreclosing the ethical relation.  However, Adorno points to a resistance of such attempts at animalization-
-the ‘stirrings’.  The gaze of the animal that Adorno mentions resonates with Derrida and Levinas’ 
absolute alterity that traumatizes and ruptures the human subject and its attempt to ontologize and 
animalize.  It ruptures the subject in so far as it infuses it with what cannot be fused.  The gaze of the 
other, before it is named ‘animal’ or ‘human’, puts one violently and irrevocable out of phase with oneself.  
Alterity for Merleau-Ponty was not as traumatizing.  His flesh was composed not decomposed.  The flesh 
of the chiasm did not get cut open and begin to rot. There was not the putrid stench of carrion.  Perhaps 
the animal looking back, the handshake with anothe r, the petting of the pet, or better, getting bit by 
another creature and the resultant infected wound, exceeds the (in)coherence of Merleau-Ponty’s flesh.  
Perhaps the unity of Merleau-Ponty’s flesh, as precarious and disharmonious as it was, was still an 
attempt to humanize the other, which is what animalization amounts to.  That is, to call another an animal 
is to annex it into the human realm with its clear limits of human and animal.  However, as Adorno 
FES Outstanding Graduate Student Paper Series 
 
 
  
Animal Scents  31 
suggests, in spite of such attempts to animalize (read: humanize) the animal still cuts across such limits.  
Thus, there is always hope for an encounter with the other, therefore hope of an ethical exchange.  
Commenting on this passage of Adorno’s, Lippit says: 
Adorno’s insight reveals that the animal as such is never a mere animal, its gaze exceeds 
the “thingness” of the nonhuman being and penetrates the human sphere—which is to 
say, that the “it’s only an animal” utterance fails, in the first instance, to perform the 
immunity from guilt that the metaphor promises to the perpetrator of violence [The 
anesthetization is never sufficient to numb one completely to the animal’s look].  Thus the 
series of pathic projections that lead inevitably to the pogrom begin with the collapse of 
the metaphor, with the failure of the figure to prevent a fundamentally ethical exchange: 
an irrevocable contact between human and nonhuman beings.67       
 
Here Lippit introduces what is perhaps missing in Merleau-Ponty’s flesh—an authentic ethical exchange.  
For Levinas, Merleau-Ponty’s ethics of the flesh remains imminent.68  Levinas will argue that in the human 
face, and in perhaps the animal’s face too, there is an ethical relation of responsibility that is more primary 
than ontology.  Derrida the animal “has a point of view regarding me.  The Point of view of the absolute 
other, and nothing will have ever done more to make me think through this absolute alterity of the 
neighbor than these moments when I see myself naked under the gaze of a cat.”69  Nudity is the epitome 
of non-insulation, and thus it is the removal of the insulation that animality provides against violence.  
Lippit suggests that this ethical exchange, that of the gaze of the animal’s face, marks the collapse of the 
metaphor.  This is where there is a breach in the human-animal border.  Here is perhaps where we will 
pick up the animal’s scent.  Lippit continues on by saying: “Pathic projections, for Adorno, do penetrate 
and affect the ethical and linguistic structures of world.  The animal and its remote, even technological 
being—Descartes, one recalls, likens animals to “automata”—are never far enough away to establish an 
ethical field distinct from that inhabited by human beings.”70  The fact that this pathic ethical contact is 
experienced as affect highlights how Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis of the corporeal and affective experience 
cannot be so quickly discarded.  This only suggests that there are both types of betrayal of the animal in 
his account of the flesh, as there is in Levinas and Derrida’s as well. 
John Caputo reconfigures Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the flesh drawing on Levinas and 
Derrida.  Caputo suggests that Merleau-Ponty’s writing on the body (and the flesh) is still very much in 
line with philosophy’s body, which Merleau-Ponty sought to challenge. 71  This not only means that this 
body is a philosopheme, with all the identity, homogeneity and unity that that must entail, but also that 
“[p]hilosophy’s body —from Plato and Aristotle to Merleau-Ponty—is an active, athletic, healthy, erect, 
white male72 body, sexually able unambiguously gendered, well born, well bred, and well buried.”  In a 
word, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the body and flesh was composed.  Caputo wants to get at the body 
that is missed and neutralized by Merleau -Ponty’s phenomenology.  His reconceived body is “disfigured, 
diseased, unburied, sacrificial, and ashen…”73 For Caputo, flesh is antiphilosophical and 
antiphenomenological. “’Flesh’ is not the sight of the ‘intertwining’ of being and sense, but the scene of a 
disastrous tearing asunder, a scene of senseless laceration, ulceration, and incineration.  Flesh is what 
happens to a body stripped of being and sense, that suffers the violent loss of its world.”74   This is the 
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aspect of the flesh that Merleau-Ponty did not focus on—vulnerability.  We are flesh.  We eat flesh.  We 
can be eaten.  The self decomposes, and it decomposes the consumed other.  Caputo notes 
[p]hilosophical bodies by and large seem not to eat; or their meals are taken in private and go largely 
unnoticed…”75  Why has consumption not been focused on?  Caputo continues:  
We who eat are ourselves eaten.  We who would like to think of ourselves as pure I or 
spirit, indeed we male philosophers who do not even breast-feed, we must confess to 
being flesh/ Fleisch76, consumable, edible meat…We dread the loss of our substance…. 
[This] announces a haunting transformation and disfiguration of the flesh which never 
quite figures in The Visible and the Invisible: to become flesh is to become consumable: 
carnivorous and caro; eating and eaten… 77 
 
 Here we see how Merleau-Ponty remained too ontological, if you will.  His conception of 
composed flesh, similar to knowledge, being, self, and so on, that he was challenging, longs to eat while 
remaining inedible.  Knowledge appropriates (consumes) the other, yet does not acknowledge it.  Caputo 
claims “[t]here is…an implicit if repressed ‘metaphysics of eating’ in metaphysics.  ‘Spirit’ which wants to 
raise itself above flesh, is in fact a higher, more perfect, decontaminated flesh, a flesh that has been 
insulated against the possibility of being consumed.”78  This insulation against consumption in Caputo’s 
analysis resonates with the above discussion of animalization of the other as an anesthetic to the 
animal’s gaze.  One cannot separate the consumption of the subject’s reason from that of their mouth.  
The animal’s look is that which exceeds/feeds knowledge’s consumption.  However, with Caputo, as with 
Adorno, and Lippit’s reading of him, this anesthetization and insulation is never sufficient.  The fact that 
‘our’ flesh must consume flesh, be it animal or plant (not that this division can be held) and, in turn, can be 
consumed, is repressed in Merleau-Ponty’s account.  This is the shift that Caputo is making in his 
refiguring of the flesh.  Drawing on Derrida and Levinas, Caputo wants to focus on flesh’s consumption 
and vulnerability.  Both make us animal.  Both reveal the animal in the human.  Our consumption shows 
our brutality.  Our consumability shows us we our mortal earthly creatures.  Both consumption and 
vulnerability are necessary to flesh, not potential.  These are two articulations of the flesh’s dependence 
on the other, most notably, the animal other.  As Lippit noted above, where the insulation fails is the point 
of ethical exchange.  With the self’s vulnerability, and the vulnerability of the other which it must consume, 
comes obligation.  We have responsibility to what we violently consume with our mouths and our reason, 
once again, not that these can be separated, nor collapsed.  These obligations are what Merleau-Ponty’s 
conception of flesh mystifies.  This is why Caputo wants to shift the  
paradigm from eye and mind and breath to nose and mouth and teeth and swallowing;  
that is why [he has] abandoned good form 79 for the improprieties of disfiguration.  [Caputo 
is] less interested in the visible than in the edible and consumable or even…the 
flammable.  For after all, flesh burns and turns to ash, and the foul smell of burning flesh 
is central to its scandal….Are ashes phenomena, beings that emerge into presence, or 
are they merely the ashen remainder [traces] of quasi beings, quasi-present, half beings 
and half nonbeing….Cinders make for obligation.  Chiasmic intertwining is still too 
Greek….still too much a captive to the metaphysics of identity and propriety and of the 
belonging together of Being and thought.80      
 
FES Outstanding Graduate Student Paper Series 
 
 
  
Animal Scents  33 
 Caputo offers us a good segue into the work of Derrida and Levinas.  He also offers us a good tip 
in tracking animals: use your nose and mouth.  Scent has an affinity for the ashen and absent presences, 
and present absence of the animal.  The mouth reminds us that the self, with its knowledge, always 
means trouble for the flesh of the other.  If we are to enter into an ethical relation with another, this will 
have to involve the economy, which is anything but an economy, of this violence (by economy here I 
mean movement of exchange).  This ethical relation can only be spelled out in Caputo’s 
(anti)phenomenological flesh.  This will allow us to trace the animal through the an-archic relation of the 
metaphoric and the literal.  This will allow us to track the animal loose in this text, in the hopes of an 
authentic ethical encounter.  An encounter that can only take place at the limit of the human self.  As 
Lippit suggests “metaphors end where they begin—in the mouth.”81  He continues: “If the animal enters 
the world then, it does so not through representation but through incorporation….  When the 
metaphoricity of the metaphor collapses, the concept becomes a metonymic thing that can be eaten.  
Derrida has much to say about eating flesh well.  Lets track the animal through this terrain which will allow 
us, in turn, to chase an ethical encounter with animal in Levinas, but first a little more on metaphors and 
writing with Derrida.  
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Derrida: The (De)composition of a Textual Animal 
 
 
The atmosphere of the forest was almost unbreathable with its Turkish-bath heat, its reeking 
moisture, and its powerful smell of decaying, rotting vegetation.  We seem, in fact, to be 
transported back to Miocene times, to an age and a climate scarcely suitable for the modern type of 
real humanity. 82  
Sir Harry Johnston.  
 
Often, the question of human ethical obligations to non-humans has pivoted on animals’ ability to 
use language.  Derrida takes a different approach which is nicely summed up by Wolfe in the following:   
“rather than extending the ability of ‘languaging’ outward, beyond the human 
sphere, one can instead move in the opposite direction and erode that notion of language 
from the inside out to show that if animals never quite possessed it, neither do we, with 
the result that language, rather than simplifying the question of ethics by securing the 
boundary between the human and the rest of creation, instead now reopens it—
permanently…”83  
 
We can now see how questions concerning language, text, and writing are central to environmentalism.  
Now let us turn to one of these questions which I opened this paper with: how can there literally be an 
animal loose in this text?  This is a good question given my claim that this animal is of a realness of the 
highest order (and this realness has meaning on many different planes).  My goal here is to capture an 
animal as it ‘really’ is, and capture our ethical responsibilities to it.  However, is it not the case that the 
only way animals can appear in a text or in writing is as a representation, metaphor, trope, or figure?  
Real animals are to be found outside of texts, in nature, or in the barn.  That is the proper locus for 
environmental ethics and politics, it is usually claimed, at least in mainstream western environmental 
thought.  However, this dominant schema all depends on very dominant divisions of the symbolic, 
metaphorical, textual, and written from that of the real, proper, material and literal (Here I am grouping 
these terms up into two general categories, which can be seen to oppose one another in the dominant 
schema.  This does a disservice to the particularity of each term and its particular relations with other 
terms, not all of which will be fully explored in this paper).  But what if these divisions do not hold?  Or 
better, what if they do hold, for very real distinctions can be made between these oppositions, yet their 
manifestations form in rather paradoxical, ever multiplying, contradictory, and very un-oppositional ways?  
For instance, often the most real is found in the most metaphorical, and vice versa.  For example, 
metaphorical poetry is often considered to best capture the real.  From where do these oppositions arise?  
What ‘logic’, let us call it a ‘broader logic’, do they follow?  It cannot be classical logic (by ‘classic logic’ 
here, I am grouping together a rather large diverse discipline that encompasses the study of logic from 
Greek times to contemporary Anglo-American analytic logic, formal logic, and so on.  Not to mention 
many other meanings of the term logic) which philosophy valorizes and which is logocentrism, par 
excellence.  Aristotle identified the first rule of classic logic as the law of non-contradiction: you cannot 
have both A and not-A.  This ‘logic’ is broader in the sense that it exceeds and encompasses classic 
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logic.  It is the logic of classic logic.  ‘Broad logic’ thrives in contradictions, much as animals do.  
Contradictions are that which is wild to reason, what is unreasonable, like animality.  This ‘logic’, in the 
broader sense, predates classic logic’s arrival, and supports this arrival.  Derrida has drawn parallels of 
this ‘logic’ to in his conception of writing and texts, also to be understood in this broader sense.  
Elsewhere he has described this logic as differance.  However, it is misleading to think that there is some 
logic, medium, or what have you, that remains the same, and which Derrida describes with various 
names, such as writing, text, differance, etc.  This is already to understand it in terms of understanding 
and such oppositions as same and different.  Beyond or on the hither side of these oppositions Derrida 
explores the economy, structures and dynamics of the logic of oppositions.  I would like to now turn to two 
of his works that explore this ‘logic’ in the use of metaphor and writing, with the aim of helping us 
understand how the ‘real’ animal, which we are tracking, can be in this paper.           
 In Derrida’s essay White Mythologies84 he looks at the use of metaphor.  He argues that 
philosophy’s and sciences’ posture to metaphor, to use gross generalizations, must always be 
ambiguous.  Metaphor must be both a loss and a gain.  If philosophy is to establish itself as the realm of 
the concept, of the philosopheme, or the proper, it must establish its other as metaphor.  In this opposition 
the proper is what is right, what is just right, and what behaves properly and rightly.  Much as a proper 
noun, or at least the metaphor for one, is proper, its identity can be fixed.  Metaphors are impossible to 
pin down.  Metaphor could not come about without this opposition, and all the other oppositions of which 
it is a part.  Philosophy needs a threat to establish its borders.  Thus, on the one hand, philosophy sees 
metaphor as a threat; metaphor is the non -literal and improper; it is claimed that it is merely the 
representation or a copy of the real and not the real thing itself.  A danger for philosophy is that it can be 
mistaken as the real.  Another danger is its unruliness.  It must, therefore, be cast out of the realm of the 
proper, the realm of the same, where it is ruining the uniformity of clear knowing, and made other--
orientalism, par excellence.  On the other hand, metaphor must always offer a gain to philosophy.  
Philosophy needs an other in which to see its reflection.  There needs to be an opening, a departure, in 
order for there to be the re-turn of re-flection and re-cognition.  The self needs an orientalised other in 
order to be re-presented with its truth.  Truth as presence.  Being presented with one’s self in the other.  
Truth as self-reflection.  Thus, philosophy is both threatened by and needs metaphor.  Further, metaphor 
needs philosophy in this oppositional formation. 
This ambiguity of metaphor can help one rethink some environmental political strategies.  For 
instance, often it is useful to reveal the hidden metaphors of a dominant ‘discourse’.  That is, show how 
what is being taken as the thing itself, is really just a metaphor for it (and the thing itself will always be 
beyond). This tends to disturb the dominant discourses sedimentation, its reification, its claims to absolute 
authority, and so on.  However, the problem with this approach becomes apparent when one notices the 
metaphors for metaphor that I just used above: ‘reveal’, ‘hidden’, and ‘sedimentation’.  These metaphors 
that were presupposed in my articulation of metaphor are themselves part of the very logocentrism that I 
am trying to disturb.  The noteworthy point being that any project of revealing the figurative in the proper, 
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will itself be dependent on the figurative.  The figurative cannot be avoided.  Further, there will always be 
a figurative aspect that will be hidden—a blind spot to reason.  Moreover, the whole opposition of the 
figurative/proper will always already be at play.  Consequently, not only will such a project necessarily 
contain a ‘metaphorical’ component, but it will always have a ‘proper’ component as well.  That is, it will 
assume to have found ‘The Real’, therefore denying its metaphoricity.    
 We are now a step closer to understanding what Lippit meant in the quote, in section (I) above, 
where he said: 
One finds a fantastic transversality at work between the animal and the metaphor—the 
animal is already a metaphor, the metaphor an animal.  Together they transport to 
language, breath into language, the vitality of another life, another expression: animal 
and metaphor, a metaphor made flesh, a living metaphor that is by definition not a 
metaphor, antimetaphor, ‘animetaphor.’  …  The animal brings to language something 
that is not part of language and remains within language as a foreign presence.  85 
 
This is all key to tracking the animal traces, the animal as trace, in the animal flesh of my metaphors in 
this text, and the metaphors in the animal flesh in the forest or barn, or at the end of your fork.  Lippit also 
notes: “The animetaphoric figure is consumed literally rather than figuratively….  At the edges of the 
mouth where the metaphor has ceased, one senses, perhaps tastes, the end of the world as such….  The 
animetaphor can be seen as a kind of zoon, inhabiting the edge of figurative language, marking the 
absence of subjectivity.”86 
 We can see a similar, yet different, ‘logic’ at work in Derrida’s discussion of writing in his essay 
Plato’s Pharmacy87.  In this essay Derrida explores the posture Plato took, in his dialogue the Phaedrus 
(and that Platonism/Philosophy/mainstream science takes) towards alterity.  The otherness of writing is a 
manifestation of the unknown, the alien, what does not make sense, what is illogical, a contradiction.  
Plato attempts to master this otherness, fix it as writing, in the narrow sense of the word—writing as 
dichotomized and opposed to speech and the represented.  Plato tries to keep the outsider of writing out 
and then fortifies the border.   
  Derrida, in a way, is not critiquing Plato for this.  Derrida is showing how this Platonic posture 
towards alterity is guided by, and presupposes a more ‘anterior’ necessity (but not an anteriority 
understood in the usual sense, not understood in terms of understanding—reason).  Derrida is showing 
that Plato had no ‘choice’ (‘choice’ already being fixed by the oppositions voluntary/involuntary, 
conscious/unconscious, etc.) but to see writing, as a threat, as a poison, by establishing truth as full 
presence.   
 The Platonic approach of mastering otherness as writing is futile.  Writing cannot be fixed by such 
oppositions as writing/speech, logos/mythos, presence/absence, self/other, etc.  In fact, it is precisely 
what cannot be dominated by these oppositions, what escapes them.  Further, it is what allows them to 
manifest, materialize, ontologize.   Writing, again here understood in a broad sense, opens up the 
element or medium these oppositions are ‘in’.  Writing in the broad sense is the ‘source’, but a source that 
is always already beyond, as such.  A source that cannot be brought into knowledge. A source that only is 
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presented in knowledge as an absence that is outside the outside, as Derrida says (because an outside is 
already tied to, thus part of, an inside, within this reflective opposition). 
 Like the metaphor, writing cannot only be treated as a threat, however.  Writing, like the term 
pharmakon (or drug) is an equivocation.  For pharmakon not only has to be seen as a poison, it also has 
to be to be seen as a remedy.  Writing then becomes a resource or supplement for the absent 
presence/origin/father/sun/king/etc.  Derrida highlights a striking example of this equivocation.  He points 
out that Plato makes an appeal to that which is to be excluded.  Plato uses writing in the ‘metaphor’ of 
The Form’s inscription on the soul, which are to be re-collected.  The other, writing, is thus in the very 
heart of the same.  Plato had to establish good writing via the bad.  That is, while attempting to institute 
the realm of the proper, the realm cleared of any mere imitations, any writing, he appeals to writing.  
Derrida argues that writing must serve as an essential supplement to what it is opposed to.  However, 
writing as a supplement for the absent presence can always be mistaken for presence (the sun mistaken 
for the father, the moon for the sun, the remedy for the poison, and so on.).  Thus, the equivocation can 
never be fixed. 
 In terms of our current hunt for the animal other, Derrida’s discussion proves very useful.  How 
are animals a pharmakon  and a supplement?  Why are we trying to capture one?  Can an animal be 
fixed?  Derrida speaks directly, not that one can speak directly, to the question of animal in another work 
to which I now turn.  
What is the relation between ‘the human’ and ‘the animal’?  Should environmentalists try to efface 
the difference between humans and animals?  This is one way that some environmentalists, including 
myself at some points, have made an appeal to Derrida’s work.  What is the limit of the human realm like?  
How has the animal been used to configure the human realm and its borders?  What happens to these 
borders when one is addressed by an animal? In Derrida’s article The Animal That Therefore I am (More 
to Follow)88 not only does he shed light on such questions as these, he also shows how he has been 
dealing with these questions all along. 
In the article Derrida looks at what is happening when a human (although wh at is ‘human’, and 
what is not, is precisely what is under question) names another creature ‘animal’. This process of naming 
the other ‘animal’, placing it in such a general category that it can include almost every other creature, 
enables the human to identify humanity.  It is the casting out of the other.  This animalization is the 
fortifying of the self, a self supposedly of pure reason, logos, identity, and so on.  To set up the human-
animal dichotomy is thus akin to those many other dichotomies that Derrida has dealt with during his 
career.  Naming animals is the determining of what is proper to man through privation; humans have 
reason, language, consciousness, etc. because that is what animals allegedly lack.  These property lines 
must be heavily guarded.  Further, any transgression must be denied, ignored and repressed with 
tremendous vigilance.  Such transgressions as sympathy for the death of an animal must not be given 
voice.  Sympathy is identification with what is supposed to be on the other side of a mutually exclusive 
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binary.  Derrida points out that it is this binary, with its denial of sympathy or any responsibility to what are 
called ‘animals’, allows for the unprecedented slaughter of countless numbers of ‘animals’. 
If this process of establishing the human-animal border causes such violence does Derrida 
suggesting that it should be broken down?  This is indeed the approach that many environmentalists have 
taken.  That is, putting forward a type of unity of human and animal.  Derrida suggests quite the contrary 
in the following: 
There is no animal in the general singular, separated from man by a single indivisible 
limit.  We have to envisage the existence of ‘living creatures’ whose plurality cannot be 
assembled within a single figure of an animality that is simply opposed to humanity.  This 
does not of course mean ignoring or effacing everything that separates humankind from 
the other animals, creating a single large set, a single great, fundamentally homogeneous 
and continuous family tree…   …it is rather a matter of taking into account a multiplicity of 
heterogeneous structures and limits.89 
  
Thus one should not try to unify humans and animals.  The differences between humans and animals 
cannot simply be ignored.  However, nor should one set up a single indivisible limit with opposing groups 
and two edges that can be traced and thematized.  Derrida wants to think of the limit as a discontinuous 
abysmal rupture.  He wants to “multiply its figures, to complicate, thicken, delinearize, fold, and divide the 
line precisely by making it increase and multiply.”90  
 Paradoxically, to set up a unilinear oppositional limit amounts to creating a homogeneous unity.  
The name ‘animal’ within this opposition remain within sameness.  It remains within the same, the self, 
identity, knowledge, self-consciousness, and so on.  Derrida calls for a rupture of this unity, a rupture with 
the self, a rupture which would be contact with the other.  Here Derrida points to the unsettling experience 
of being seen by his cat (A topic we have already explored in Adorno’s text above).  This being seen is 
disturbing.  It disturbs the self.  It disrupts the unity of the single oppositional limit of human-animal.  The 
other’s gaze is an alterity and individuality that cannot be captured by an oppositional limit.  It precedes it.  
But again, this preceding cannot be understood within the realm of temporality or knowledge, it is an 
anachronistic preceding.  The realm of knowledge and the chronological is already the realm of single 
oppositional limits attempting to capture pure presence.  This contact with the other that is called animal 
happens before this naming.  The self arrives late to this other (I take this as one of the meanings of the 
word ‘follow’ in Derrida’s title).  The question now becomes: what can be gleaned from this contact with 
this irreducible creature addressing me with its gaze?  This is Derrida’s starting point in attempting to 
recognize the responsibilities of those erroneously named ‘humans’ to those erroneously named 
‘animals’.  Derrida developed this (anti)conception of responsibility out of Emanuel Levinas’ radical 
reorientation of ethics.       
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Levinas: Decomposition and Facing The Animal Otherwise 
 
Levinas makes the ethical relationship more primary than the ontological one.  The ontological 
relation here is everything that is.  Ontology here is the study of being in all its manifestations and is 
manifestation, as such, be it materiality, phenomenology, existence, knowledge, or what have you.  The 
ethical relation for Levinas is what is absolutely otherwise than being.  And this radical alterity precedes 
and exceeds the opposition of being and not-being.  This reorientation of ethics over ontology challenges 
most, if not all, western thought, including environmental thought, which has traditionally held ontology 
(knowledge, truth, being, substance, matter, reason, and so on, all of which Levinas sees as ontological) 
as primary.  Consequently, Levinas shows, or shows how you cannot show, the limits of knowing.  
Specifically, he shows the limits, and the underlying ‘causes’, of knowledge in the ethical realm and in 
meeting our responsibilities to the other.  Levinas highlights the imperialism of knowledge.  The self 
appropriates alterity into sameness; knowing—consciousness—can thus be seen as self-consciousness, 
egoistic, and a nostalgic search for self-resemblance.  Levinas claims that the primacy of being has 
fueled this imperialism of knowledge.  Its totalizing effect eliminates otherness (or at least tries to) leaving 
only homogeneity.  For Levinas, knowledge, being, and so forth, all presuppose and are dependent on 
the ethical relationship.  All knowledge is always already in relation, and subordinate to our ethical relation 
with the other.  The ethical relation ‘precedes’ knowledge.  Thought arrives late to the ethical.  The, by 
now familiar, scare quotes on the word ‘precede’ in the above sentence already attest to the hegemony of 
knowledge; ‘precede’ has always been thought of only in terms of thought.  The radicalness of Levinas’ 
ethical relation is that it is of a wholly other realm than thought (A realm that is not a realm.  A realm that 
cannot be captured by the distinction of realm/non-realm).  And importantly, it cannot be brought into the 
realm of thought, knowledge, being, etc.  Thus, the ethical relation even precedes preceding.  It is 
precisely what cannot be totalized under the imperialism of knowledge.  It is the Absolute Other.  Yet our 
responsibility to the other, given from a frailty and from a height in the face of the other, commands the 
impossible: one must bring the other into the same, one must represent the un-representable in 
knowledge.  But it must be represented only as that which is beyond, while all the while keeping the futility 
of this venture in the foreground.  This responsibility can never be satiated.  In fact, for Levinas the more 
one meets one’s responsibility the greater one’s responsibility becomes.  Through the double bind, that 
we have already discussed, of having to represent the un-representable, there is a betrayal of the other.  
But remember, betray has two meanings: (i) to do a disservice to, and (ii) to reveal.  It is a revealing but 
only as a trace.    
 From this all-too-brief sketch we can see that Levinas is acutely aware of the limits of knowledge.  
That is, knowledge’s imperialistic assimilation of ethical alterity into sameness.  However, when it comes 
to the non-human other, it could be argued that Levinas seems quite unaware of the appropriating 
dynamics of knowledge.  On the few occasions that Levinas does speak to the question of whether we 
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have ethical responsibilities to animals he is reluctant to say that they can have a face, in his ethical 
sense.   
The face for Levinas is what surpasses the self’s thought of the other.  The face is where the 
other is revealed (betrayed) to the self.  It exceeds the self because it is an encounter with the infinite—
being’s exterior.  The face is what puts the self and its freedom into question.  It makes the self 
responsible to the other. The manifestation of the self can be seen as already a response to the demand 
for responsibility to the face.  This is in part what Levinas means by ethic’s primacy.  The self and 
knowledge are already subordinate and a reply to the other.  His shift to the primacy of ethics over 
ontology is this subordination of the ontological into the context of responsibility.  One always already 
finds oneself responsible to the other.  And the face is the porthole where the other presents itself 
otherwise than a mere negation of the self.  However the term ‘porthole’, which seems to locate this 
exchange, is still ontological.  Levinas shifts the exchange of the face to ethical less localizable terms 
such as command or demand, which also highlights the primacy of the ethical other.  What is, or what we 
are, or what the animal is, is secondary to our responsibility to the injunction revealed through the face.  
This ethical relation is beyond what is, hence it can only be understood, or better, not understood, 
ethically.  One’s responsibility comes before understanding.  When one must meet this responsibility one 
cannot understand it.  One must give alms to the needy before, or in spite of not, making sense of the act.  
The face and the ethical act are what cannot be made sense of.  Sense is of the self.  The gift to the other 
will not make sense to the self.  The self will want an exchange.  Levinas characterizes the face as a 
vulnerability (which raises interesting parallels with Caputo’s, and thus Merleau-Ponty’s, discussion of the 
vulnerability of the flesh).  Vulnerability demands the posture of giving to the other.  Thus Levinas’ ethical 
reorientation demands just the openness to the other that is crucial to animal tracking.  If we want to meet 
our responsibility to the animal we must turn to its face.  Also, in Levinas’ theory, the face is not (only) to 
be limited to the phenomenon of the anatomical region of the front of your head.  Perhaps the waging of 
the tail can be ‘face like’, in Levinas’ sense?            
What is noteworthy here, is not whether animals do or do not have a face (although this question 
will be broached below), but whether Levinas can even make a radical opposition between the human 
and the non-human (or between the living and the non-living) or not?  Is such an opposition not just the 
totalizing (logocentric) effect of knowledge?  Is the animal other, qua other species, not an absolute 
other?  Or is human ethical difference more primary than species difference?  Can Levinas consistently 
maintain that the ethical other is wholly other and that it can only be human?  Further, what are the 
reasons that Levinas maintains this opposition?  What ‘logic’ or 'necessity' is there to the places where 
animality or ‘the natural’ shows up in Levinas’ text?  Was it a shortcoming of Levinas to not give animals 
faces (if he indeed did not)?  Moreover, where do such questions come ‘from’?  Could these very 
questions already be a response to the call of the animal other—a (respons)ibility?  Are not these very 
questions quite Levinasian?  And do they not precisely represent the tremendous value Levinas’ theory 
has to offer environmentalism?  Or do these questions, which are (also) Derridian ‘in nature’, conflate 
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Levinas' ethical relation with knowledge?  A lot of questions.  Questions that index my long struggle in 
engaging Levinas’ theory with environmental concerns.  Not a lot of answers; but in spite of this, or better, 
precisely because of this (for answers prevent one from living ‘through’ an aporia, and there is more to 
things than what can be given in the form of an answer) Levinas’ ethical reorientation has and will 
continue to prove fruitful for environmental thought.  But what exactly is Levinas’ relation to environmental 
thought?  
 
A Face or Not a Face?  Is that the Only Question? 
 
 
 Levinas offers some answers  in an interview: 
[Question]…is there something distinctive about the human face which, for example, sets 
it apart from an animal? 
Levinas:  One cannot entirely refuse the face of an animal.  It is via the face that one 
understands, for example, a dog.  Yet the priority here is not found in the animal, but in 
the human face.  We understand the animal, the face of the animal, in accordance with 
Dasein.  The phenomenon of the face is not in its purest form in the dog.   In the dog, in 
the animal, there are other phenomena.  For example, the force of nature is pure vitality.  
It is more this that characterizes the dog.  But it also has a face.91 
 
 One way of approaching the question of Levinas and environmentalism is to give a face to 
animals.  This, however, presupposes and further reifies the dualism between the human and the animal.  
Should not the absolute otherness of the face of another come before any identification of species?  The 
dualism of human and animal arguably may be The environmental problem, for all the same reasons that 
Levinas himself points out in other dualisms, such as self/other, being/non-being, and so on.  When it 
comes to the human/animal schema, Levinas seems obli vious to these dualistic dynamics.  Dynamics 
that seem to get further mystified when one tries to determine if animals have faces. 
If one puts aside the project of ‘facing nature’ for the time being, one may notice how the animal 
here, in Levinas’ response, is always secondary and extrinsic to the human.  Levinas is configuring the 
‘human’ face out of a background of animality.  Also of importance, he is foregrounding the alterity of the 
human face against the background of Heidegger's Dasein.  Thus, the human/animal dichotomy is 
brought into, reinforces, and reflects Levinas’ opposition to Heidegger, arguable one of the most 
influential oppositions in Levinas’ texts.  Further on in the interview we again see this configuring of the 
human out of the animal: 
[Question] According to your analysis, the commandment ‘Thou shalt not kill’ is revealed 
by the human face; but is the commandment not also expressed in the face of the 
animal?  Can an animal be considered as the other that must be welcomed?  Or is it 
necessary to possess the possibility of speech to be a ‘face’ in the ethical sense?   
[Levinas:] I cannot say at what moment you have the right to be called ‘face’. The human 
face is completely different and only afterwards do we discover the face of the animal.  I 
don't know if a snake has a face.  I can’t answer that question.  A more specific analysis 
is needed.92  
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But this “more specific analysis”, here, in this context, would only conceal this configuration of the 
human out of the animal.  A configuration that makes the animal an ‘afterthought’, when in fact, any talk of 
the ‘human’ must always presuppose the animal.  Or, as he later says in the interview, “[i]t is clear that, 
without considering animals as human beings, the ethical extends to all living beings ...the prototype of 
this is human ethics.  Vegetarianism, for example, arises from the transference to animals of the idea of 
suffering.”93  Is this “extension” and “transference” not the appropriation of alterity by the same, par 
excellence?  Moreover, the project of extending the face to animals seems dependent on the radical 
opposition of the human and animal; there can be no such project if no opposition is maintained.  This 
project of transference, and his maintaining of this opposition, both only develop out of Levinas’ appeal to 
animality as a resource to configure the human face as the pure locus of the ethical relation.  Moreover, 
this configuration and dichotomization represent the appropriation of alterity that Levinas was challenging.  
 When looking at the same configuration of the human out of animality in Heidegger, Derrida 
draws this conclusion: “There is no such thing as Animality, but only a regime of differences without 
opposition.”94  He continues in saying that animality is a human artifact that is difficult to wield, and whose 
effect is to efface difference and to homogenize.  If we are to assume that this conclusion can be applied 
to Levinas than it would appear that he is effacing difference, which is what he set out to maintain.  As we 
saw Derrida state in section (IV) above (and it is important enough that it bears repeating again):  
There is no animal in the general singular, separated from man by a single indivisible 
limit.  We have to be able to envisage the existence of ‘living creatures’ whose plurality 
cannot be assembled within the single figure of an animality that is simply opposed to 
humanity.  This does not of course mean ignoring or effacing everything that separates 
human kind from the other animals, creating a single large set… …it is rather a matter of 
taking into account a multiplicity of heterogeneous structures and limits.  Among non-
humans and separate from non-humans there is an immense multiplicity of other living 
things that cannot in anyway be homogenized, except by means of violence and willful 
ignorance, within the category of what is called the animal or animality in general. 95 
 
Again it would appear that Levinas’ human face is producing the exact homogenizing violence 
that it was to disrupt.  For there can be no doubt that the configuring process that I have highlighted thus 
far is the exact process that Derrida is pointing to when he describes the “single figure of an animality that 
is simply opposed to humanity”.  How could it be that Levinas has done what he set out to avoid ?  Was it 
just a matter of “willful ignorance” as Derrida suggests?  This willful ignorance would amount to ignoring 
one’s responsibility to the other.  Perhaps this is just the violent side of the betrayal of every articulation of 
the un-articulatable?  That is, this violent totality that appears to have ensued out of Levinas concept of 
the face (that which was to have been the quintessential un-totalizible) may be the consequence of 
bringing the other into the same.  This may be the necessary repercussion of the double-bind that 
Levinas confronted.  We should not forget that  the face will inevitably and equivocally manifest into a 
mere concept.  Levinas was challenged with having to make the unreasonable reasonable.  He had to 
spell out a relationship that is impossible to spell out, the relation that is the possibility of possibility and 
impossibility. 
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 One should also notice the striking similarity between the multiplicity of species and living 
creatures that Derrida envisions, and the multiplicity of humans, races, cultures, bodies, etc. that Levinas 
himself envisioned in his paper entitled Language and Proximity that will now be discussed below.  Is not 
Derrida just granting ‘living creatures’ a Levinasian face?  This similarity is quite apparent when Levinas 
looks at the primacy of ethics in this paper. 
    Here Levinas shows the role of language in the ethical relation to the other.  Levinas ‘identifies’ 
an aspect of language he describes as pre-originary or pre-language language.  This is the ethical aspect 
of language, or language ‘understood’ ethically.  Or better, it is language as ethics—pre-reflective contact 
with the other.  Another way he describes language ethically is by identifying a double ‘nature’ of 
language.  In language there is an “amphibology” (equivocation) of the ‘saying’ and the ‘said’.  The ‘said’ 
is language understood and appropriated by the self.  The ‘saying’ of the other is what resists and 
transcends this knowing and appropriation.  In the saying is our responsibility to the other.  The other’s 
saying is an irreducible singularity.  But the saying hides in the said, or is present as a hidden.  The 
saying gets trapped in the said.  The saying’s singularity gets reduced to/in the said.  However the saying 
requires the said to be revealed.  Ethics requires both and without their always entwined relation one 
could not meet one’s responsibilities.  There is always a saying in the said and vice versa.       
In this arrangement language is the approach to a singularity that is proximity with the other, or 
ethical contact.  Here he says that “[l]anguage is the possibility of entering into a relationship independent 
of system of signs [one could also read: the said, unity, totality, genus, species, homogeneity, set, etc.] 
common to the interlocutors.  Like a battering-ram, it is the power to break through the limits of culture, 
body, and race.”96  It seems to me that this is the multiplicity without unity that Derrida was just describing.   
 My choice of these two quotes (the ones most immediately quoted above by both respective 
authors) serves another purpose.  The two quotes focus equivocations; the irony of this similarity is that 
Derrida and Levinas use this multiplicity of heterogeneity for opposite ends.  Levinas, in the same 
paragraph, immediately preceding the one quoted above,  claims the impossibility of a “…language that 
would be imprisoned in the particularism of a species.”97  Derrida, several lines down, in the same 
passage as the one just quoted above claims: “It would not be a matter of “giving speech back” to animals 
but perhaps of acceding to a thinking, however fabulous and chimerical it might be, that thinks the 
absence of the name and the word otherwise, as something other than privation.”  One could draw from 
this that ‘animals’ would have something along the lines of Levinas’ saying or pre-language.  Thus, 
‘animals’ would have a face.  But not a ‘human’ face “extended” from the “prototype” in its “purest form”.  
Rather, it would be a face qua absolute alterity that would cut across species difference.  A ‘cutting 
across’ that would not allow for any strong distinction between the ‘animal’ and the ‘human’, as such.  
This would be at odds with Levinas’ apparent restriction of the face to the human.  But more importantly, it 
would be at odds with Levinas’ unquestioned reliance on the dichotomy of human/non-human.  Perhaps 
Levinas went wrong with his premise that we cannot hear ‘animals’ speak?  Adriaan Peperzak notes in 
summarizing the main characteristics of Levinas’ transcendent relation that “[t]he human other’s 
FES Outstanding Graduate Student Paper Series 
 
 
  
Animal Scents  44 
otherness differs absolutely from the (quasi-) otherness of any non-human being because the former 
cannot be assimilated or integrated as a moment, part, or function of my consciousness, my knowledge, 
my plan, or my self-realization.”98 Maybe the ‘animal’s’ otherness is not ‘quasi’ and cannot (and has not) 
be(en) fully assimilated?  
 
 
Derrida-Levinas, Levinas-Derrida 99? 
 
However, all is not that clear yet (not that clarity does not have its limits).  One could say that the 
above ‘critique’, or better, deconstruction, of Levinas ’ posture to the non-human is a manifestation of a 
more generalized deconstruction of Levinas’ theory by Derrida (or Levinas’ theories deconstructing of 
themselves).  For instance, in Violence and Metaphysics, and Adieu one could generally say that what 
Derrida is doing is ‘classic’ deconstruction.  That is, he highlights the dynamics, structures, and economy 
of differance and logocentrism at work in Levinas’ theory.  For example, Derrida shows how Levinas may 
have dichotomized such oppositions as being/otherwise than being, ontology/ethics, said/saying, 
politics/ethics, etc.  One way of reading this is Derrida showing Levinas that he has to be more vigilant to 
the effects of differance.  Levinas does not focus on the inextricable intertwining of oppositions as much 
as he does the non-collapsibility of them.  For Derrida, it makes no sense to speak of a pure saying if it 
will always already be intertwined with, yet not reducible to, the said.  Similarly, Derrida shows how one 
cannot speak of a pure ethics.  Ethics requires politics to be ethical.  Politics here being a supplement, but 
a dangerous one too, a pharmakon.  Ethics needs politics to be ethical, however, politics is what makes 
the ethical unethical.  The same goes for all the other oppositions in Levinas.   
It could be argued, as it was by Levinas,100that deconstruction is only applicable at the level of 
knowledge, and that Derrida conflates Levinas’ ethical relation, proximity, approach, contact, saying, etc. 
with the realm of knowledge.  Levinas claims that he is articulating the ‘pre’-knowledge relation.  The 
relation before thought gets there, where this before is not understood in terms of knowledge, which it has 
to be.  Thus, it is a before before or an outside outside of knowledge.  This is the pre-original pre-personal 
contact with the other where this ‘pre’ is not understood causally or as a temporal sequence, or using 
formal logic.  It is the anarchical, anachronistic relation with the absolute beyond.  Therefore, Levinas 
claims, deconstruction is not applicable to it.  It could also be argued that Levinas was sufficiently 
attentive to the violence of the language—the said—he was imbedded in and to the workings of 
logocentrism.  For instance, Levinas offers substantial critiques, perhaps the most substantial, of formal 
logic, reason, light, the said, etc.  All of which are in harmony with, and acknowledged antecedents to, the 
very deconstructive ‘technique’ that Derrida is ‘using’.  All the more reason to conclude that if Levinas was 
this attentive to the workings of logocentrism, then perhaps what he offers is un-deconstructible.    
I am not sure whether this tension (if it is that) between Levinas and Derrida should or can be 
eliminated.  It could just be that it is a difference of emphasis.  Both positions resonate with me.  
Sometimes they appear at odds with each other, sometime complimentary, and other times as both.  It 
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does seem that Levinas is not as attentive to how he is always already embedded in the knowledge 
realm, and that Derrida’s work does make a better bridge for the ethical to be political.  However, it also 
seems as though something valuable in Levinas’s theory is lost when you rigorously deconstruct it.  
Further, at times it appears that Derrida is distorting Levinas’ ethical theory in an appropriating move that 
fits it in with ‘his’ deconstruction.  Yet at other times Derrida seems to offer more than, and move slightly 
beyond, Levinas’ theory.  There are also moments when I think that Levinas’ ‘ethics as first philosophy’ (a 
phrase Levinas uses to describe his theory of the primacy of ethics over philosophy and/or ontology) is 
the same as ‘deconstruction as ethics’ (a phrase Derrida develops in such works as Force of Law).      
What is important here is that one can situate Derrida’s deconstruction of Levinas’ treatment of 
the non-human within Derrida’s more general deconstruction of Levinas’ corpus, and Levinas’ responses.  
Consequently, we might now ask: Is it legitimate for Derrida to deconstruct species difference?  Or is the 
ethical relation beyond such a ‘critique’?  Is something valuable in Levinas theory lost when it is 
deconstructed?  These are the questions I would like to keep in mind while I take a look at two more texts 
by these authors.   
 
We Must Eat, So We should Eat Well 
 
The first text is an interview with Derrida called Eating Well or the Calculation of the Subject101.  
Levinas often characterizes the ethical relationship as that of being a hostage.  One is a hostage to the 
other because the other comes from a height.  The relation is asymmetrical.  Your responsibility for the 
other comes before your relationship to yourself.  Further, you are responsible for the other’s 
responsibility.  Thus, for other others.  This responsibility is undeniable.  If one were to decline their 
responsibility there would still be an acknowledgment of it.  To ask ‘am I responsible?’ already 
presupposes responsibility.  In fact, responsibility needs to be declinable.  If there were no choice it would 
not be a responsibility.  One may choose to meet one’s responsibility or not, but one cannot choose being 
made responsible.  It comes as a force.  But as a force that cannot be captured by such dichotomies as 
freedom/necessity, conscious/unconscious, active/passive, and so on.  This responsibility is exemplified 
by the command of the face that ‘thou shalt not kill’ the other, ‘thou shalt not kill thy neighbor’.    
What is of interest in this interview is where Derrida points out that ‘[t]he other, the neighbor, the 
friend, is no doubt in the infinite distance of transcendence.  But the ‘thou shalt not kill’ is addressed to the 
other and presupposes him.  It is destined to the very thing that it institutes, the other as man.  It is to him 
that the subject is first of all held hostage. ”102 Levinas’ other can only be a human, and humans can only 
be the other that should not be killed.  By limiting responsibility to the human, Levinas ironically limits it to 
sameness in terms of species.  And more importantly, Levinas’ responsibility demands the dichotomy of 
human/non-human.  In this exclusion of our responsibility to other species in Levinas’ theory, and all of 
the Judeo-Christian tradition, Derrida wants to identify what he calls a “sacrificial structure. ”103  This is the 
place left open “…for a non-criminal putting to death” (this would suggest that Levinas’ responsibility to 
human others tacitly implies a consent to murder the non-human).  Derrida continues: “Such are the 
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executions of the ingestion, incorporation, or introjection of the corpse.  An operation as real as it is 
symbolic when the corpse is ‘animal’ (and who can be made to believe that our cultures are carnivores 
because animal proteins are irreplaceable?), a symbolic operation when the corpse is ‘human’.  But the 
‘symbolic’ is very difficult, truly impossible to delimit in this case….”  Therefore, it is not just a matter of 
putting animal flesh in one’s mouth, where this is understood only within a physiological-biological-
mechanical framework.  A framework that has become all too reified in the dominant Western tradition.  A 
framework whose metaphoricality and symbolism has been lost or repressed resulting in it been seen as 
The Real.  As we have seen elsewhere in Derrida’s works, the metaphorical or symbolic can never be 
fully separated or collapsed from the real or material.  For instance, there will always be symbolism in the 
so-called real flesh on your fork and there will always be a materiality to the appropriation of the animal in 
representing it metaphorically.  Certainly this sacrificial structure is intimately tied to the radical separation 
of the real/symbolic opposition.  When one deconstructs the opposition of real/symbolic one can see that 
the eating of flesh understood physiologically is just one instantiation of the violent relation of self to 
other. 104  Just as with other oppositions the logocentric posture attempts to make an either/or out of a 
both/and 105.  Derrida situates Levinas’ ethical exclusion of animals within a “carno-phallogocentrism”106 
that permeates the relation of self to other, where the valorization of male virility is tied to the consumption 
of flesh.  For instance, Derrida points out the overwhelming dominance of the head of states being male 
meat eaters.  Levinas’ tacit acceptance of the sacrificial structure falls inline with this bias. 
As Wolfe points out, well quoting Beardsworth, Levinas articulation of the other as other is 
different than Derrida who wants to keep  
the site of the other, “as complex as possible, as a ‘play’ of time and law, one which 
refuses the exemplary localization of thought”…. For Derrida, “for the other to be other it 
must already be less than other” because the alterity of the other is always caught in 
what “Eating Well” calls the ‘sacrificial economy’ of carno-phallogocentrism; and hence, 
“one cannot welcome the other as other”; in consequence of which, as Beardsworth 
notes, “alterity can only be the loss of the other in its self-presentation, that is, the ‘trace’ 
of the other”.  What Levinas surrenders, then, is “a differentiated articulation between the 
other and the same,” the effect of which “is the loss in turn of the incalculable nature of 
the relation the other and its others (the community at large)”107    
 
Levinas’ theory of ethical difference and species difference parallels his discussion of sexual 
difference in many key facets.  Fortunately, many remarkable writers have already identified a 
problematic structure in Levinas’ work on the ethical and sexual diffe rence.  Consequently, I would now 
like to briefly outline these feminist works and extend them to Levinas’ discussion of species difference.   
For Levinas the ethical relation is primary before any differentiation of any other type.  It is before 
different iation, as such, and sexual difference is no different, if you will.  As he puts it “It isn’t woman who 
is secondary, it is the relation to woman qua woman that doesn’t belong to the primordial human plan.  
What is primary are the tasks accomplished by man as a human being, and by woman as a human 
being”. 108   As Vasseleu points out, “ethics is the necessary first principle in Levinas’ account of humanity.  
Ethics is a relationship to an other which allows no other determination beyond otherness….  Levinas 
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argues that woman, or the feminine, is not secondary to man, or masculinity, but rather the inauguration 
of difference, which is secondary to ethics.”109 Irigaray offers perhaps the most illuminating analysis of 
Levinas’ position on sexual difference.110 Irigaray shows that main problem with Levinas is that well 
operating under the guise of sexual neutrality, he presents the ethical relation in sexualized terms, 
specifically masculine ones.  Levinas’ account of the ethical relation in fecundity and the intimate caress 
is one example of this.  Without fully elaborating this account here, it is sufficient to note that Levinas 
account of carnal intimacy appropriates the feminine.  It does so in so far as feminine is not an otherness 
of impossible determination but merely the corresponding negation of the masculine.  Irigaray’s claim 
here is that there is no account of the feminine that is not reducible to the masculine or to the self.  
Derrida commenting on this asks: “How can one mark masculine the very thing said to be anterior, or 
even foreign, to sexual difference?” 111  Vasseleu summarizes that: “What both Irigaray and Derrida are 
asserting is that it is not possible to argue for the asexuality of the ethical relation while specifying 
fecundity in (homo)sexual terms.  Asymmetrical subjectivity [the asymmetry of Levinas’ self-other ethical 
relation] which is the site of transcendence, is already conditioned by the exclusion in the form of sexual 
difference.”112  Chanter, speaking to Derrida’s remarks, points out that by placing ethics over sexual 
difference has Levinas “not mastered femininity by mastering its origin, sexual difference [?]”113   
Not only is it useful to understand Irigaray and Derrida’s feminist critique on its own terms, it is 
also useful to transpose it into the question of Levinas’s ethical relation and species difference. When 
Derrida asks above: “How can one mark masculine the very thing said to be anterior, or even foreign, to 
sexual difference?” Can we not ask of Levinas: How can one mark human the very thing said to be 
anterior, or foreign, to species difference?  Using Vasseleu in a similar fashion we could similarly claim 
that Levinas’ ethical relation, the supposed unconditional, par excellence, is already conditioned by 
exclusion in the form of species difference.   
Vasseleu concludes that in Iragaray’s statements about “the irreducibility of one sex to the other 
Irigaray is emphasizing that each sex is not entirely incorporable by the other; between the sexes, there is 
a material remainder.  The remainder is the limitation within which Irigaray contends that there can be 
sexuate existence …. The point of the non-substitutibility of the sexuate other for Irigaray is that sexual 
difference is the mark of the impossibility of determining the alterity of the other.”114  So too could we not 
speak of an irreducibility of one species to an other?  Similarly, species difference is the same mark as 
sexual difference of the impossibility of determining the alterity of the other.  Here, after negotiating the 
aporia of thinking of species difference and ethical difference, in this ‘remainder’, do we catch a glimpse 
of the animal we are tracking.  The Okopi, if you will.  Irigaray’s ‘remainder of sexual difference’ does not 
lend itself to support or act as the foundation for Levinas’s masculine ethics.  Without femininity as a 
resource masculinity, under the rubric of asexual humanity, cannot rise up to differentiate itself.  Likewise, 
‘the remainder of species difference’ does not permit the dichotomization of the human from the animal 
and thus the “sacrificial structure” Derrida identifies in Levinas’s works. This ‘remainder of species 
difference’ does not sustain or support any delimitation of humanity above a justly edible animality.  
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Here again it is noteworthy to return to the animal tracking tip referred to earlier as the 
‘equivocation of the pen’.  There will always be an equivocation between the non-criminal carnivorous 
consumption of animals that sustains humanity and the consumption of animality by reason, the word and 
logos, for instance, that sustains humanity.  Because of this equivocation any animal tracker and any 
environmental theory must be vigilant to both manifestations of injustice.            
In an attempt to do what Levinas did not—sacrifice the sacrificial structure, which structures and 
is structured by this carno-phallogocentrism—Derrida envisions an ethical encounter not reducible to the 
oppositions of human/animal or even by living/non-living.  Here, it is not a matter of changing the demand 
of the face to ‘thou shalt not put to death the living in general’, but rather of passing the ethical frontier 
…between several infinitely different modes of the conception-appropriation-assimilation 
of the other, then, as concerns the “Good” [Bien] of eve ry morality, the question will come 
back to determining the best, most respectful, most grateful, and also most giving way of 
relating to the other and of relating the other to the self.  For everything that happens at 
the edge of the orifices (of orality, but also of the ear, the eye—and all the "senses" in 
general [important for our discussion is the nose]) the metonymy of “eating well” [bien 
manger] would always be the rule…. …The moral question is thus not, nor has it ever 
been: should one eat or not eat, eat this or that, the living or the nonliving, man or animal, 
but since one must eat in any case and since it is and tastes good to eat and since there 
is no other definition of the good,  how for goodness’ sake should one eat well?115  
 
It seems that Levinas’ tendency to dichotomize has resulted in the opening of the ‘sacrificial 
structure’.  In assuming that there is a pure ethical relation separate from politics, language, being, and so 
forth, Levinas assumed that it was possible not to kill.  But the ethical is always inextricably intertwined 
with the violence of the political, language, being, etc., thus we must kill, we appropriate alterity—we must 
eat.  It thus becomes, as  John Caputo says, a matter of “…vigilance about the effects of these practices, 
about the waste and cruelty of excessive carnivorous practices.”116  Again, this should be read into all the 
instantiations of introjection; ‘we’ get eaten, ‘we’ eat ourselves, ‘we’ eat women, ‘we’ eat non-whites, ‘we’ 
eat the third world, and ‘we’ eat the ‘non-human’.  Importantly, we eat the ‘non-human’ in many ways.  
Once the solid single limit between the real and the symbolic is disrupted, we can understand what 
Derrida means when he says: “Vegetarians, too, partake of animals, even of men.”117  We eat animals by 
calling them animal.  By assuming that they are a homogenous unit.  We eat animals every time we other 
them under such monoliths as ‘wilderness’, ‘spectacles’, ‘resources’, ‘environment’, etc.  It looks as if 
Levinas’ inattentiveness to the problematic of oppositional limits is producing devastating consequences, 
especially in terms of his theory’s utility for the environmental movement. 
 This hypothesis is only further confirmed when we see what Levinas has to say about eating.  
Remarkably, in the following passage, Levinas does deconstruct the real/symbolic opposition, and he 
also recognizes the necessary dependence of the self on the other, but not with Derrida’s aim of eating 
well and minimizing the violence of assimilation.  Rather, Levinas makes a move in an opposite direction 
by using eating to highlight the inexhaustible surplus of the other in relation to the self:    
Eating, for example, is to be sure not reducible to the chemistry of alimentation.  But 
eating also does not reduce itself to the set of gustative, olfactory, kinesthetic, and other 
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sensations that would constitute the consciousness of eating.  This sinking one’s teeth 
into things which the act of eating involves above all measures the surplus of the reality 
of the aliment over every represented reality, a surplus that is not quantitative, but is the 
way the I, the absolute commencement, is suspended on the non-I. 118  
 
 It is beginning to look as though Levinas’ theory is of no great import to environmentalism.  
Derrida is no doubt  justified in showing how, despite all his groundbreaking ethical insights, Levinas 
unquestioningly adopts a very traditional and problematic posture to the non-human, and human.  It is 
clear that humans have no direct ethical obligations to the non-human for Levinas.  However, with an 
examination of another text, we cannot so easily draw these conclusions.  Again, we must ask ourselves: 
is not something valuable lost when we rigorously deconstruct Levinas’ theory?  Does Derrida himself not 
confound the ethical relation with knowledge in doing so? 
 
“I am Thinking of Bobby”,119 Meeting the Other as a Dream.120  
  
 In a paper entitled The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights Levinas does seem to sacrifice the 
sacrificial structure.  After hinting (if it can be called a hint, which I will return to momentarily) at a parallel 
between the horrors of war and the killing of animal Levinas says: “Such idea make one lose one’s 
appetite!  In fact, they can also come to you at the family table, as you plunge your fork into your roast.”121  
The family table being the sacrificial structure that Derrida just denied Levinas.  But here we see Levinas 
draw attention to the opening where killing is acceptable.  Astonishingly, in what follows we see Levinas 
follow Derrida’s analysis almos t exactly.  Levinas goes on to say: “There is enough, there, to make you a 
vegetarian again.  If we are to believe Genesis, Adam, the father of us all, was one!”122  But like Derrida, 
Levinas does not stop at the question of eating meat or not eating meat.  Rather it is a question of eating 
well.  Levinas continues: “There is enough there to make us want to limit, through various interdictions, 
the butchery that every day claims our ‘consecrated’ mouths!”123  Levinas here offers exactly what Derrida 
envisioned; the sacrifice of sacrifice, and the move from ‘thou shalt not kill’ to the infinite metonymy of 
eating well.  Which is exactly what Derrida rightfully concluded was an impossibility for Levinasian ethics.  
What spawned this insightful reversal of the otherwise dogmatic posture towards the non-human in 
Levinas’ thought?  Was it a response to a call?   
 This reversal appears within the context of Levinas recounting his encounters with a dog during 
his imprisonment in a Nazi concentration camp.  Levinas describes how the prisoner’s encounters with 
the guards and other non -prisoners “stripped us of our human skin.  We were sub-human, a gang of 
apes…. …We were beings entrapped in their species; despite all their vocabulary, beings without 
language.”124  Amazingly, it seems that here we have Levinas acknowledging the problematics of 
animalizing.  At least he is recognizing these problematics when it is humans that are animalized.  And 
perhaps he is hinting, in some way, to the sacrificial structure’s involvement in the condoning of the 
human genocide, but more on that in a moment.  Levinas goes on to describe the humanizing abilities of 
the animal:  
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There where seventy of us in a forestry commando unit for Jewish prisoners of war in 
Nazi Germany…. …about halfway thro ugh our long captivity, for a few short weeks, 
before the sentinels chased him away, a wandering dog entered our lives.  One day he 
came to meet this rabble as we returned under guard from work.  He survived in some 
wild patch in the region of the camp.  But we called him Bobby, an exotic name, as one 
does with a cherished dog.  He would appear at morning assembly and was waiting for 
us as we returned, jumping up and down and barking in delight.  For him, there was no 
doubt that we were men…. …This dog was the last Kantian in Nazi Germany…125 
 
How are we to understand Levinas’ recognition of the horror of animalizing humans and this 
acknowledgment of the ability of animals to enter into an ethical relation with humans?   
 In his paper Am I Obsessed by Bobby? (Humanism of the Other Animal) John Llewelyn notes 
that Levinas “all but proposes an analogy between the unspeakable human Holocaust and the unspoken 
animal one.”126  I would have to similarly conclude that this analogy is ‘present’ in the paper as a whole.  
Such an analogy would have undoubtedly brought all of Levinas’ anthropocentric ethics, elaborated thus 
far, into question.  Perhaps that is why he all but proposes the analogy?  Speaking to this analogy, or 
absence there of, David Clark adds a caveat to Llewelyn’s statement just quoted.  “By characterizing the 
essay as doing everything but  making such a proposition, we [namely Llewelyn] must be careful not to 
shrink from its double scene of sacrifice.  For is this not exactly the proposition that Levinas is making, 
even and especially if he does not literally write it out for us to read?”127  The consequences of Levinas 
proposing that there is a similarity (but still a difference) between the killing of the Holocaust and the 
allowable killing of animals are vast.  This is a move that deconstructs the opposition of human/animal 
that is everywhere else found in Levinas’ writing.  This move allows us to consider the ‘animal’ as a 
neighbor.  It gives the animal a face.  Or better, it allows us to imagine what it wo uld be like to have an 
ethical encounter with the face of the Other before considering its ‘species’.  Ethical alterity thus has a 
primacy over species alterity.  Or more precisely, the alterity of species difference is not appropriated by a 
human/animal dichotomy and as such is as site for an ethical encounter.  The human/animal dichotomy 
can finally be relegated to the realm of knowledge and ontology, which arrive late to ethical 
transcendence.  Levinas permits us to imagine these possibilities—but only for a brief moment.  Only for 
a moment, because the exclusionary dualistic ethics that we have seen everywhere else in Levinas’ 
thought, are also peppered throughout this paper too.  Nonetheless, there was this moment that left as 
soon as it came.  A glimpse, trace, or scent of the animal at the precise moment were Levinas was 
describing his encounter with an animal.  
 If we linger in this moment and/or this scent what we see is a striking similarity between Levinas 
and Derrida’s ethical visions.  However, Derrida would most likely claim there could not be any pure 
ethical encounter wholly separate from ontology.  That is, one could not put a clear limit between the 
other’s ethical alterity in the face, and the other’s alterity qua species (This is to say that there is no 
dichotomizing the alterity of the face with any other ‘logical’ or ontological alterity, which is the relational 
difference of something in a set, with every other thing in that set, for instance.  This is not to say that 
there could not be a ‘post-deconstruction distinction’ made.  As Derrida said above, the distinctions 
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between animals and humans are very real.)  Derrida would also surely note that these two alterities 
could not be collapsed either.  Thus, it is precisely through the animal’s otherness qua species that one 
can contact the other qua face.  This resonates with what Levinas often says, in entirely different 
contexts, about a point one reaches where they no longer need to see the other as a limit, but rather see 
it as inspiration, in both senses of the word.  As Clark puts it: “Bobby's face cannot entirely be refused, not 
because there is something residually ‘human’ or ‘pre-human’ about it, but precisely because of its 
nonhuman excess, because that face… …belong[s] uniquely to the animal, to this animal.”(my 
emphasis)128   Levinas himself describes the dog as “[s]omething that disrupts society's games (or 
Society itself).”129 
Let us return to the original question we put to Levinas: what is the relationship of Levinas’ theory 
to environmental thought?  If we remain and swelter in the moment in Levinas’ theory where it is possible 
to envision an authentic ethical encounter in spite of, or precisely because of, species difference, we will 
see a tremendous resource for environmental thoug ht.  Namely, we will see the limits of the ‘thought’ in 
environmental thought.  That is, we will use Levinas to go beyond thought and ontology to meet our 
responsibility to the other.  Even if this means using a Levinas against his own thought, which he had to 
enter into.                  
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The Animal’s Arrival Announces its Departure 
 
Finally we have captured the animal otherwise.  We have caught a good enough glimpse of the 
animal loose in/outside of this text to meet our responsibility to it, to capture it otherwise.  We have 
tracked its scent through the disruptions with/in the compositions of Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Derrida, and 
the African jungle.  The interrelation of these three authors’ writings created the (dis)equilibrium of 
tensions necessary for an ethical encounter with an animal beyond conception.   
Merleau-Ponty pulled the tension towards a composed animal, in his characterization of the 
chiasmic and ambiguous unity of the flesh.  Here we saw that perhaps the animal’s otherness is an 
alterity that exceeded the (in)coherence of Merleau-ponty’s conception of the flesh. Merleau-Ponty 
presented the relationship of the self and other, but in doing so he made the other—what is absent—
present.  But this is not (only) a failure for Merleau-Ponty.  It can also be seen as the impossible double-
bind of the animal’s betrayal; Merleau-Ponty had to re-present the other to meet his responsibility to it, but 
in so doing he appropriated it. 
Levinas pulled the tension towards disunity and decomposition.  In place of Merleau-Ponty’s 
ambiguity Levinas points to an-archy.  For Levinas the other is an incommensurable difference that 
overwhelms and traumatizes the self.  Levinas’ other opens the self up with no hope of recovery.  It is a 
relation of being a hostage rather than the site of intertwining.  Merleau-Ponty brought the self and other 
into a relationship.  Levinas showed how the other is what is completely unrelated to the self.  His notion 
of the absolute other, if applied to the animal other, allows us to go beyond reason to meet an animal in 
an ethical encounter.  However, in order to find this Levinasian ethical relation with animals we had to 
aggressively ferret it out of Levinas’ texts.  However, ferreting is a very legitimate and effective tracking 
technique.       
Derrida applies pressure to the other two writers by showing that the animal is always in an 
equivocal relation of (de)composition.  Derrida points out that Levinas may be correct in critiquing 
Merleau-Ponty’s composition, unity, phenomenology, presence. However, Derrida also points out the 
impossibility of articulating (re-presenting) an absolute other that is beyond presence, phenomenology, 
composition, etc.  Derrida explores this impossibility in terms of light in the following:  
Who will ever dominate it, who will ever pronounce its meaning without being pronounced 
by it?  What language will ever escape it?  How, for example will the metaphysics of the 
face as the epiphany of the other free itself of light?  Light perhaps has no opposite; if it 
does, it is certainly not night.130 
 
Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, in turn, tug back at Derrida.  For instance, often it 
seemed that Derrida conflated Levinas’ other with the realm of knowledge in order to deconstruct it.  
Levinas here can be seen pulling Derrida beyond knowledge and light.  What is clear is that these 
author’s interrelations form many tensions.  Moreover, many of these tensions cannot fully be explored in 
a paper of this size.  However, even to organize the differences between these authors with the figure of 
a tug-of-war is to resolve them.  In many ways these author’s differences end up being points of contact 
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and similarity.  This complicates their interrelation, thus keeping these interrelations unresolved, therefore 
opening them up to the animal’s scent.  Adding to this un-resolve is the inability to fix these authors’ 
positions in the tug-of-war.  For instance, Vasseleu says:  
Derrida has commented that, if one might argue that The Phenomenology of Perception 
falls within the metaphysics of presence or a belief in the possibility of coincidence 
between consciousness and being, with The Visible and the Invisible ‘it is even harder to 
say’.  Far from being a matter for judgment, the problematic linkage between language 
and embodiment which is opened up between the two philosophers—between 
phenomenology’s bodily text and deconstruction’s texual body—is an immensely 
provocative one… …deconstruction’s reference to phenomena owes a debt to Merleau-
Ponty’s break with the concept of perception as a natural coincidence of consciousness 
and things.  On the other hand, so to speak, from the perspective of deconstruction, the 
chiasm is texual and is thus open to further reading.  131      
    
The unresolved interrelations of these authors prevented the text from coming to a close.  This 
kept it open to an ethical encounter with an animal.  If we had resolved the question of the animal we 
would have lost its scent.  We would have thought we had arrived at the animal.  But the animal arrived at 
in thought is tamed.   
Tracking the scent of animal can be seen as the way to be political, in so far as animality serves 
as a flag -post, at the limit of knowledge, for what is not represented and is repressed.  As Derrida said 
above, he has been doing nothing but speaking to the question of the animal.  He later adds:  
Must not the place for the Other be ahuman? If this is indeed the case, then the ahuman, 
of at least the figure of some—in a word—divinanimality, even if were to be felt through 
the human,  would be a quasi-transcendental referent, the excluded, foreclosed, 
disavowed, tamed, and sacrificed foundation of what it founds, namely, the symbolic 
order, the human order, law and justice.132    
 
An ethical encounter with an animal demands a (respons)ibility in representation. In my response 
I have presented the absent animal as a present scent.  But with this animal’s arrival comes its departure.  
The animal’s arrival is never definitive.  As the opening quote on the okapi suggested, tracking animals is 
extremely exhausting, and there is no time to pause for a rest.  I have taken a break from tracking in order 
to capture the animal in this paper.  But in doing so, I have lost its scent.  So again we must ask: where is 
the animal?  
 
“[E]ven now, hidden deep in the rain forest, the okapi has been able in some ways, to remain a 
mystery animal.”133 
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